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INTRODUCTION
It was once said that for every right there must be a remedy. ^ The Mexican Writ
of Amparo seems to convey this idea. It provides for the nullification of any act of
government that is deemed unconstitutional by a Federal Court. However, there seems
to be an area of the law where this Writ is powerless.
When someone is convicted for a crime and consequently imprisoned, the Writ
of Amparo provides for the immediate liberty of the claimant. Nevertheless, there is no
legal remedy that will restore the time, money, reputation and dignity that is lost when
an individual is convicted. Certainly, the simple liberation can not begin to repay for
these loses. The goal of this work is to find a way in which this situation can be
alleviated.
This article will explore one possible solution to the gap presented by the
Mexican constitutional litigation system. To propose such a solution I will explore the
possibility of borrowing from the American legal system a procedural institution that
may provide for damages as a form of relief. Damages can not fully restore the loss of
liberty, only turning back time can do this. However, damages relief is what will come
closest to giving back what was lost.
Legal borrowing has been very useful in improving the law of foreign
countries.2 This study will confront opposition from scholars that do believe that the
Writ of Amparo is a genuine Mexican institution that does not need improvements, or
that it would not benefit from being compared to other instruments of constitutional
1 Marbitryv. Madison, 5 U.ii. 137, 163 (1803).
2 See Watson, Alan, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW, 1 7 (2"^ Ed. 1993)
control.^ But even if no useful borrowing can be achieved, a comparative study will
always be helpful in getting to know the institution compared by reflecting it against
foreign legal systems."^ This becomes a ver>' interesting enterprise in light of the
growing need for understanding between countries, due to the increased economic,
political and social links that are part of an era of globalization.
^
The choice of borrowing from the American legal system seems a natural one.
due in part to the adoption of a federal system of government in both countries. This
system, in turn, makes the relationship between states and particularly the judicial
branches of the states and the federal government comparable. These similarities should
make any borrowing between the two countries as painless as any borrowing can be,
although the end result will probably be left to chance.^ In addition, the American legal
system is enough of an authority that any legal transplants can be easily accepted by
Mexican law-makers and scholars.^ All of these factor make it reasonable to look at the
American legal system first, before looking elsewhere for answers to the problem
presented by the current state of things with the Writ of Amparo.
It can not be stressed enough that the scope of this work is very limited. Given
that a gap exists in the regulation of the Writ of Amparo (and this presumption may not
be accepted at all), the methods used to help the situation vary. I have chosen to explore
only one of the alternatives that might be available. Furthermore, one may choose to
move beyond the very limited realm of damages for unconstitutional convictions, and
apply these to any situation within the scope of relief of the Writ of Amparo. If one
chooses to stay within the concrete situation presented here, then one can analyze other
^ See Fix-Zamudio, infra note 16, ch. 3 at 136.
4 Mat 132.
5 Id. at 148.
^Id.
' Id. At 44-46 (The authority of the source used is very important in the future acceptability of the
transplant).
legal systems in the search for a solution. One can also seek an independent route.
These proposals fall out of the scope of this work. 1 will concentrate on the options
presented by the American legal system, for damages relief of unconstitutional
convictions.
As a consequence of the method employed this work will first deal with an
analysis of the Writ of Amparo. The analysis would deal with two areas in particular:
the objective of the Writ and the requirements necessary to obtain relief. This is not
representative of a comprehensive study of the Writ. For this purpose, several studies in
English have been published.^ The same type of study will be used to introduce the
Writ of Habeas Corpus. These two sections will be the content of the Part I of this
work. Part II will explore the requirements needed to obtain damages for
unconstitutional state convictions under § 1983. Finally, in Part III I will analyze the
theoretical and legal obstacles for the incorporation of a damages remedy within the
Amparo framework, and I will offer reasons why these arguments should be discarded.
Then I will consider the alternatives for damages that the Mexican legal system offers.
As a general conclusion I will propose certain amendments to the Amparo Statute to
create the possibility for damages as part of its scope of relief
^ E.g. Baker, Richard D. JUDICIAL REVIEW IN MEXICO: A study of the AMPARO SUIT (1971), Clagett,
Helen L.,. THE MEXICAN SUIT OF AMPARO, 23 Geo. L. J. 4 1 8 ( 1 945), Eder, Phanor J., JUDICIAL REVIEW IN
LATIN AMERICA, 21 Ohio St. L.J. 570, 599-604 (1960), Rosenn, Keith S., JUDICIAL REVIEW IN LATIN
AMERICA, 35 Ohio St. L.J. 785, 796-800 (1974), Biles, Robert E., THE POSITION OF THE JUDICIARY IN THE
POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF ARGENTINA AND MEXICO, 9 Law Americas 287 (1976) and Clarke, David S.,
JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN LATIN AMERICA, 2 Hastings Const. L. Q. 405 (1975).
CHAPTER ONE
A. Basics Of The Writ Of Amparo
1. Objective of the Writ
The objectives of the Writ of Amparo are established in the Federal
Constitution.' According to article 103, the courts of the Federation have jurisdiction
over conflicts where there is a violation of constitutional rights,^ when the federal
authorities violate or restrict the sovereignty of the States of the sphere of attributions of
the Federal District^ or when the authorities of the States or the Federal District invade
the sphere of competence of the federal authority."^
This article must be interpreted, in turn, with article 107 of the Constitution.
This article states that the controversies that are mentioned in precept number 1 03 must
be subject to the procedures and forms determined by law, and in accordance with the
bases considered in that same article. ^ Consequently, the Amparo Statute regulates both
of these constitutional articles.^ The Writ of Amparo must be used to solve the
controversies mentioned in article 103.^ The Supreme Court, however, has stated that
'const, art. 103.
^Id. at fraction I.
^Id. at fraction II.
^Id. at fraction III.
^CONST. art 107 at Preamble.
°L.A. (The official name of this statute is the Statute of Amparo Regulatory of Articles 103 and 107 of the
Constitution of the United States of Mexico).
'Id., at 1. (The three fi-actions of thesis article are identical to those of article 103 of the Constitution, but
instead of stating the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the preamble says that the resolution of these
conflicts is the objective of the Writ of Amparo).
even in the cases of fractions II and III there must be a violation of constitutional rights.
for the Writ of Amparo to be used.^ Therefore, constitutional rights are the basis of the
Writ of Amparo^ and their protection is the objective of the Writ. '0.
Despite this fact, the Constitution recognizes that the Writ of Amparo can be
used to protect the legality ofjudicial decisions • ^ and procedures. '- The reason for this
is the Due Process Clause, ^^ which enables individuals to challenge any procedural
violations through the Writ of Amparo,'"* and can go as far as protecting the entire legal
system. '5 In this sense, it can be said that the primary objective of the Writ of Amparo
is the protection of individual rights, but, since the Constitution includes a constitutional
right to Due Process and Legality '^ the entire constitutional and legal systems can be
protected. ' ^
^"Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico", 70 S.J.F. 4718 (5a. Epoca, 1940).
9m
'^Tesis jurisprudencial 11, Apendice 1917-1975, Primera Parte, Pleno, P. 32; see also . Tesis 613, 6
Apendice de 1995, 408 (8a. Epoca, 1995); cf Tesis 614, 6 Apendice de 1995 408 (8a. Epoca, 1995)(In
this lower court decision recognized by the Supreme Court, it is stated that the not only does the Writ of
Amparo serve as a method to protect constitutional rights, but is also a buffer between the State and the
citizens); but see "Rutilio Larios", 38 S.J.F. 2467 (5a Epoca, 1933)(In this decision of the First Chamber
of the Supreme Court, it is stated that a modem view of the Writ of Amparo is not limited to the
protection of constitutional rights, but also, to uphold the Constitution and to procure its compliance in
particular cases; especially in Criminal Law)
' 'const., art. 107 at fraction V.
'2m at fraction III.
I^CONST., art. 14, t 2; see "Maria Guadalupe O'Reilly y Coags", 73 S.J.F. 1730 (5a. Epoca, 1942).
'^CONST., art. 107, fractions III and V.
^^See Burgoa, Ignacio, EL JUICIO DE AMPARO, 149-158 (31st ed., 1994). (For a discussion on how the
Writ of Amparo through the constitutional right to legality protects the individuals from any type of
constitutional violations from the authorities).
'^CONST., art. 16 at 11 1.
^'See Burgoa, supra note 15 at 145-148 (For a discussion on how the Writ of Amparo has transformed
from a procedure to safeguard the Constitution into an instrument to protect legality).
2. Requirements for Relief
The general principles that are described here are not those that make up the
composition of the Writ of Amparo, they are merely those that the petitioner must
comply with to have his suit heard. '^
a. Existence of a Direct and Personal Grievance
The first of these principles is the personal and direct grievance, which has
constitutional 19 and statutory^O pedigree.^l This principle states that only the person
who is affected by the act of government has standing to initiate an Amparo process.--
In other words, only the individual who suffers an injury has standing to bring an
Amparo suit, which in turn must be understood as involving an offense to the rights or
interests of the person.-^ This is what is know as a personal grievance: the fact that the
grievance "falls precisely on a determined person [...]."-^'*
The grievance may not be abstract or generic and it has to occur in the past or in
the present, not in the future, so that simple probabilities of an act happening are
completely excluded from challenge. ^5 In other words, the grievance must be perceived
in reality.26 The concept of an indirect grievance is contrary to the principle of
^^See Castro, Juventino V., GARANTIAS Y AMPARO, 329-330 (8th ed., 1994) (This author groups the
general principles of the Writ in three, principles that relate to the action, principles that relate to the
process and principles that relate to the decision; here we deal with the first of these groups)
l^coNST., art. 107 at fraction 1.
20l.a., art. 4.
~^See Serrano Robles, Arturo, El Juicio de Amparo en General y las Particularidades del Amparo
Administrativo in MANUAL DEL JUICIO DE AMPARO (2 ed., 1997)
"L.A., art. 4.
23"Aurora M. de Mendoza", 48 S.J.F. 2290 (5a Epoca, 1936); see also "Cia. Mex. de Petroleo 'El
Aguila', S.A.", 35 (5a Epoca, 1937); S.J.F. 974 (5a Epoca, 1932); and "Sindicato de Obreros y
Empleados de la 'Isleta' 54 S.J.F. 1579; but cf "Alejandro Samano", 108 S.J.F. 1810 (5a Epoca, 1951)
(Procedural violations do not cause an injury per se, since they may be corrected in the final judgment)
^'^See Burgoa, supra note 1 5 at 27 1
.
-^See Serrano, supra note 21 at 32-33.
2"5ee Castro, supra note 1 8 at 334.
constitutional rights whicii are personal. 2^ The person who suffers an indirect
grievance has no right to initiate an Amparo process.-^ only the person who is directly
affected may proceed.^9
The concept of grievance goes beyond the traditional civil meaning of the word,
it involves an offense on the rights or interests of a particular person, not necessarily an
economic restriction.^^
b. Exhaustion Doctrine
The exhaustion doctrine supposes the exhaustion or exercise of ordinary means
of defense to attack the act that is deemed unconstitutional. If the ordinary remedies are
not exhausted, the petition is dismissed.^'
The Writ of Amparo, when used as a post-conviction remedy, may challenge
only the final decisions of a court, which may not be revoked by any ordinary
procedural means, and that affect the defenses of the petitioner; regardless of whether
the constitutional violation occurred during the process, transcending into the final
sentencing, or in the final decision.^^ When, during the process,^^ a question of
constitutionality arises concerning the interpretation of statutes or international treaties,
ordinary procedures must also be exhausted, but only if the result can be corrected in
the final decision of the court.^^
^^"Nicolas Leano", 3 S.J.F. 831 (5a Epoca, 1918)
28"Arcadio Molina", 67 S.J.F. 3708 (5a Epoca, 1941)
-"Tesis 25, 6 Apendice de 1995 17 (5a Epoca, 1921); see also "Banco Occidental de Mexico, S.A.", 23
S.J.F. 125 (5a Epoca, 1928)
^^"Aurora Mendoza", supra note 23; see also Burgoa, supra note 1 5 at 270.
^^See Burgoa, supra note 15 at 282.
^^coNST., art 107 at fraction III a); accord L.A. art. 158 at Tf t 1 and 2; see also Tesis 44 5 Apendice de
1995 28 (5a Epoca, 1919) a«£/ Tesis 61 6 Apendice de 1995 39 (8a Epoca, 1989)
^'l.a., art. 160 (this precept mentions some of the procedural violations that may be challenged through
this form of amparo)
34 art. 158 at II 3.
8Violations that can not be corrected in the final decision, that occur outside of
trial or at its conclusion, are subject to review, but not through the Writ of Amparo as a
post-conviction remedy before a Collegiate Circuit Court. Instead, these fall within the
jurisdiction of a District Court.^^
Before the Writ of Amparo is petitioned, one must first appeal the conviction. ^^
If the conviction is appealed but the process is not culminated, and is considered stayed,
the Amparo may not proceed, and if it does it must be stayed also.^^ However, the
affirmation that there was no compliance with the exhaustion doctrine must be fully
accredited before the petition for Amparo is dismissed.^^ An important exception to the
exhaustion principle may occur when there are direct violations to the Constitution,
during the criminal process.^^ These considerations have to be studied by the
Collegiate Circuit Court, because the mere existence of an ordinary remedy is not
enough; it must be sufficient to give relief in a way that is at least equal to that of the
Writ.^O
The reason why an exhaustion of all procedural remedies is required goes to the
nature of the Writ of Amparo, which is extraordinary-. In other words, the Writ must be
the last line of defense against unconstitutional acts.^^l There is also a desire to keep
constitutional litigation to a minimum, allowing for lower courts to solve particular
^^CONST., at. 107 at fraction VII; accord L.A., art. 114 at fractions IV and V; see also Tesis 61, supra
note 32
36"Joaquin Matus". 15 S.J.F. 88 (6a Epoca, 1963)
3'7"Luz y Senoria Tetzicatl" 58 S.J.F. 22 (6a Epoca, 1960)
^^Tesis 27, 2 Apendice de 1995 16 8a Epoca, 1994)
^^Tesis 154, 3 Apendice de 1995 104 (7a Epoca, 1982); accord Tesis 728, 3 Apendice de 1995 540 (7a
Epoca, 1979); see also Tesis 727 Apendice de 1995 539 (7a Epoca, 1976) (In this lower court
jurisprudence, the same principle is stated, but in a different way, since it establishes that when only
statutes are deemed unconstitutional the ordinary remedies must be exhausted)
"^^Tesis 209, 6 Apendice de 1995 143 (5a Epoca, 1941)Tesis 986, 6 Apendice de 1995 678 (7a Epoca.
1969)
^^See Serrano, supra note 21 at 34.
problems; without excluding the possibility that eventually the decisions may be
challenged through this Writ.'^^
When the court considers that the exhaustion principle was not met, the
consequence^^ is that the case is dismissed. This may happen either because the
ordinary remedies were not exhausted at all;^"^ or because they were tried, but the State
court has not yet rendered a decision."*^
c. Initiative of the Affected Party
The Writ of Amparo can only be petitioned by the person who suffers the
grievance of the unconstitutional act.'*^ This means, mainly, that the Federal
Government or the States do not have a cause of action under the Writ of Amparo that
they can exercise on behalf of their citizens."^^ This is a logical consequence of the fact
that the Amparo is a procedure, so it must have the rules of standing that any other
procedure has."^^ The Supreme Court has interpreted this principle strictly; by saying
that without suffering any grievance there is absolutely no right of standing;^^ so that
without injury, there is no cause of action.^^
42Tesis 681, 6 Apendice de 1995 681 (8a Epoca, 1992).
^^See Serrano, supra note 21 at 34 (This author calls it a sanction).
44l.a. art. 73 at fraction XIII.
45m at fraction XIV.
^^CONST. art. 107, at fraction I; accord L.a. art. 4 at H 1.
'^'See Serrano, supra note 21 at 3 1
.
'^°Id: see also Burgoa, supra note 15 at 268 (There are two types of methods to uphold the Constitution,
political and jurisdictional, the Amparo is jurisdictional in nature so it contains the same elements of any
procedure, however, in some countries the control is political, so the State or one of its institutions can
challenge the constitutionality of certain acts without the citizens consent) and Castro, supra note 18 at
331 (Jurisdictional controls help maintain the Separation of Powers, because the conflicts between the
Branches of government are minimized, both in number and in effect, since they only affect the party
with standing)
"^^Tesis 25, supra note 25.
50Tesis 92, 47 Apendice de 1995 208 (5a Epoca)
B. Basics Of The Writ Of Habeas Corpus
1 Objective of the Writ.
The Constitution of the United States does not provide the general principles by
which the writ of Habeas Corpus can be used. The mention of the writ itself is ver\'
vague; it only states that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require
it."5l
When this clause has been interpreted directly, limitations have been laid out as
to the possibility of suspending the writ. These can be summarized as follows:
Although it has been urged at times that neither the executive nor the
legislative can constitutionally suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus, it has
generally been accepted that the writ cannot be suspended by the president
without delegated authority from Congress, and that the Congress can in the
instances indicated by the Constitution. Whether a suspension of the writ is
constitutional on a particular occasion is clearly a judicial matter.^-
In a more recent case. Ex Parte Quirin,^^ the Supreme Court denied a pethion of
Habeas Corpus based on a proclamation that the President issued as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces, denying access to civil courts to persons who were to be
tried for war crimes. This was a suspension of the writ during World War II, which can
be considered as extraordinary causes mentioned in the Constitution for the suspension
of the writ. Later on, in Swain v. Pressley,^'^ the Supreme Court upheld a provision of
the District of Columbia Code that substituted the Habeas Corpus with a motion before
the D.C. courts. Arguing that the Suspension Clause applies only to Habeas Corpus as
it was understood by the Framers, the Court upheld this post-conviction "suspension" of
the remedy. 5^
^'u.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
^-See 1 Antieau, Chester J. THE PRACTICE OF EXTRAORDINARY REMEDIES, 5 (1987) (citations omitted).
53317 U.S. 1 (1942).
54430 U.S. 372(1977).
^^But see Steiker, Jordan, INCORPORATING THE SUSPENSION CLAUSE: IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS? (92 Mich. L. Rev., 862). (This article claims that by
the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted as a means to make sure that states complied with federal law,
so this Amendment in a way incorporated the use of the remedy as a post-conviction remedy into the
Constitutional scheme).
Nothing in the Constitution helps us decipher the nature of the writ or its
meaning or reach. The reason for this is that the nature of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
has been changing through time. In medieval England the Writ was first used to solve
jurisdictional disputes between ecclesiastical courts, conciliar courts and local tribunals:
it was not until the time of the Lord Chancellor, that the writ was used to challenge
unlawful detentions, although it excluded convicted persons from obtaining relief.^^
In the United States, the original view of Habeas Corpus was the same. In an
early decision. Chief Justice Marshall stated that there was no federal jurisdiction to
provide Habeas Corpus, and therefore, legislation was needed. ^^ Legislation was
enacted, and gradually it expanded the use of the writ. Most significantly, the Act of
1867 allowed the use of federal Habeas Corpus for prisoners held under state law.^^
This has sparked a historical debate that goes to the heart of the nature of Habeas
Corpus relief. The first view is presented by Professor Bator. He claims that the wxit
was used, both in England and the United States as a way to challenge executive
detentions, not as a post-conviction remedy. It was not until the Act of 1867 that
convictions began to be challenged. However, it is clear to Bator that one of the reasons
for this was the lack of any other method by which to obtain review from the Court, in
criminal cases. ^^
In the current century, the use of the writ was fiiither expanded by two Court
decisions, Frank v. Mangum^^ and Moore v. DempseyM The doctrine established by
these cases states: "if the court finds that a state tribunal has failed to supply 'corrective
process' with respect to the full and fair litigation of federal questions, whether or not
'jurisdictional, in a state proceeding, a court in Habeas may appropriately inquire into
-'^See Antieau, supra note 52 at 1.
57£.v Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75.
^^See Fallon, Richard H., Meltzer, Daniel J. and David L. Shapiro, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM, 1340-1341 and 1364-1368 (4th ed. 1996).
^'^See Bator M. Paul, FINALITY IN CRIMINAL LAW AND FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS FOR STATE PRISONERS,
474-483. (76 Harv. L. Rev. 441); but see Woolhandler, Ann, DEMODELING HABEAS (45 Stan. L. Rev.
575) (Claiming that the history of habeas does not justify a restricted or liberal use of the writ because it
is only a manifestation of the changes in the scope of constitutional law and federal jurisdiction).
6O237 U.S. 309(1915)
6I26I U.S. 86(1923)
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the merits in order to determine whether the detention is lawful."^'- in conclusion.
Bator suggests that there is no present historical evidence to support the principle of
Brown v. Allen^^ which allows for complete relitigation of constitutional issues in
Habeas review.
This view was opposed by Justice Brennan in his majority opinion in Fay v.
Noia.^'^ Brennan rejects the notion that Habeas has been used historically to challenge
executive detentions or to solve jurisdictional problems between courts. He claims that
the "function has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society
deems to be intolerable restraints''.^^ Further on. he claims that there is nothing that is
novel in the use of Habeas Corpus as a means to redress due process violations. ^^ The
contention he makes is that Habeas has always been used to fight restraints contrary to
fundamental law.^^
The significance of history is in question today, not only because of these
contrasting opinions, but because its analysis does not take into account that Habeas
cases involve a great variety of topics from which it is hard to draw general conclusions.
In the view of Fallon "many of the decisions do not clearly articulate an understanding
of Habeas Corpus -particularly one that corresponds neatly to modem categories and
perceptions. "6^
One of the uses of Habeas Corpus is as a post-conviction remedy of state
prisoners. In this instance the writ is not an appeal, but a collateral attack on the
conviction, which is not subject to normal rules of res judicata.^^ Under Brown v.
^^See Bator, supra note 59 at 486-487.
63344 U.S. 443(1953).
64372 U.S. 391 (1963); but see Felker v. Turpin, 116 S. Ct. 2333 (1996) (This must recent decision
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist adopts Bator's view of the historical debate).
65m at 401-402.
66m at 402.
67/^/. at 405; c/Bowen v. Johnson, 306 U.S. 19 (1939) (Chief Justice Hughes writing for the Court admits
that habeas is available when constitutional right are violated, but this is only an exception to the general
rule that jurisdictional matters compromise the scope of habeas review).
68Fallon, supra note 58 at 1368.
^^See Fallon Richard H., Meltzer, Daniel J. and David L. Shapiro, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM, p. 90 (4th ed. Supp. 1997).
13
Allcn^*^ federal courts may relitigate constitutional issues first raised in state court, even
though they were fully and fairly litigated. This principle, although not overruled, has
been chipped away. Stone v. PcnvelP^ stands for the principle that Fourth Amendment
violations can not be relitigated via Habeas Corpus, but only by certiorari before the
Court. On the other hand, except for very few cases, league v. Lane''- stated that relief
under Habeas cannot be based on "new law". The Court reaffirmed this principle in
Sawyer v. SmithJ^ Furthermore, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1 996^^^ adds another exception by which relief can only be awarded if the state courts
misapplied constitutional principles in a unreasonable manner. The statute reads:
(d) An application for the Writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted vv ith
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in lights of the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.'^
Despite the limitations considered above, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may be
used to challenge the constitutionality of detentions, and specifically convictions. The
language of the statute reads:
(a) The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district
court shall entertain an application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground
that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.^^
"70344 U.S. 443 (1953).
"71428 U.S. 465(1976).
"72489 U.S. 288(1989).
'^497 U.S. 227 (1990). (The Court found that, although it had created new law in a subsequent decision,
this was not applicable to the case at hand).
"^^Pub. L. No. 104-132.
"7^28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
"7^28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
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2. Requirements for Relief
Although the statute does allow for the use of Habeas as a post-conviction
remedy, the petition must meet certain prerequisites for relief. This section deals with
these requirements.
a. "In Custody"
This requirement finds its basis in § 2254(a) and (d), transcribed above. Its
reach extends to situations where the person is not actually in physical custody.^''
Generally, "in custody" means "restraints not shared by the by public generally[...]"'7^
Because of this, a person may be considered "in custody" when he is in prison.^^ on
parole;^^ at large on his own recognizance,^' as a result of a stay,^^ imprisoned in one
state but challenging a conviction in another state,^^ among other possible situations. ^"^
The petitioner must be in custody at the time the request for relief is filed, but
this rule is flexible. It is recognized that the sentence may carry with it consequences
that go beyond the period of confinement; so as long as those restrictions persist the
case may not be dismissed for mootness.^^ Consequently, the petition is not considered
moot if the person held in custody is released, after filing a petition.^^ In this line of
thought, a sentence that is a collateral consequence of a previously served conviction,
may be challenged, if the petition can be construed to mean an attack on the conviction
'^'^Jones V. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) at 239.
''^Id. at 240.
"^^e.g. Fayv. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963)
°^e.g. Jones v. Cunningham, supra note 77.
81eg. Hensleyv. Municipal Court, 371 U.S. 345 (1973)
82m
83eg. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)
^^See Wilkes Jr., Donald E., FEDERAL POST-CONVICTION remedies and relief, § 8-14 (1996 ed)
°^Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (This case was not rendered moot because the petitioner was
not permitted to engage in certain businesses, serve as an official of a trade union, vote in state elections
or serve as a juror as consequence of his conviction)
^^Chacon v. Wood, 36 F. 3d 1459 (1993)
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that is presently being served. ^^ Nevertheless, where no custody resulting from a
previous conviction can be found, the petition must be dismissed. ^^ "Jurisdiction exists
if there is a positive, demonstrable relationship between the prior conviction and the
petitioner's present incarceration."^^ The Court has found that when a previous
conviction is used to enhance a second sentence the relationship is not strong enough.^^
Similarly, when the petitioner seeks to put aside a habitual offender ,^' or a sexually
violent predator determination,^- by challenging an initial conviction, the relationship
between sentences is deemed too weak. On the other hand, a first sentence may be
challenged when it is being served consecutively with a second sentence, regardless of
its expiration.^3
Among the defenders of Habeas, the custody requirement is not popular, and
should be eliminated, to give the convicted person a complete opportunity to litigate his
case in a federal forum.^4
b. Exhaustion Doctrine
The statutory provision regarding exhaustion reads as follows:
(b)(1) An application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that-
(A) The applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of
the State; or
^'^Young V. Vaughn, 83 F. 3d 72 (1996); see also Weaver v. Piing, 925 F. 2d 1097 (1991) (Where a
petition was dismissed because the previous sentence was completely expired)
^^Malengv. Cooyt,490 U.S. 109(1989)
^^Sinclair v. Blackburn, 599 F. 2d 673 (1979); see also Feldman v. Perrill,902 F. 2d 1445 (1990)(In this
case the "positive and demonstrable relationship" was not found, even though parole was denied based on
the sentence already served)
^^Custis V. United Stales, 5 1 1 U.S. 485 (1994); see also Gavin v. Wells,9\4 F. 2d 97 (1990)
^^Partee v. Hopkins.30 F. 3d 101 1 (1994)
^~Brock V. Weston, 31 F. 3d 887 (1994)
^^Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39 (1995)
94See Yackle, Larry W., EXPLAINING HABEAS CORPUS, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991 (1985) at 1019; but see
Meltzer, Daniel J., HABEAS CORPUS JURISDICTION: THE LIMITS OF MODELS, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2507
(1993) at 2510.
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(B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect
the rights of the applicant.
(2) An applicant for a Writ of Habeas Corpus may be denied on the
merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies
available in the courts of the State.
(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion
requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless, the State
through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.
(c) An application shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has
the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the
question presented.^^
As the statute states, the exhaustion requirement refers to the use of state judicial
remedies before seeking Federal Habeas relief. Federalism and comity are the main
reasons given for the existence of this requirement.^^ Nevertheless, there is also a
concern for an orderly administration of justice. ^^ Despite these affirmations, it is
generally recognized that exceptions may arise in extraordinary circumstances.^^
The must obvious way to comply with this principle is by actually exhausting
state remedies.99 One needs to exhaust only those remedies that are available at the time
of filing. ^^0 The courts have interpreted the statutory language to mean that the
petitioner must first give the State a fair opportunity to hear the federal claim of the
9528 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c).
"^Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, supra note 83; see also Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1
(1981) (Exhaustion serves to minimize friction between federal and state courts, by allowing the later the
first opportunity to correct constitutional violations) and Vasquez v. Hiltery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986)
(Exhaustion is meant to give state courts an opportunity to decide upon allegations of legal error, without
federal interference)
97 Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); see also Rose v. Lundy\ 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (The
exhaustion doctrine was designed to protect the role of state courts in the enforcement of federal law)
^^Ex Parte Royale, 117 U.S. 241 (1886)
^^See generally Wilkes, supra note 84 at § 8-15
100/r^ V. Noia, supra note 79.
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convict,'^' even if they do not rule on the merits. '^^- It is not necessary to seek certiorari
before the Supreme Court, '^^ before filing for Federal Habeas Corpus.
Furthermore, the Court has recognized, for a long time now, that there may be
extraordinary circumstances which may not warrant compliance with exhaustion. '^'^
These circumstances must be studied in each individual caseJ ^^ but the courts have
admitted the following exceptions: when there is no adequate state remedy
available, ^0^ or the remedy is not accessible; ^^^ when the person has been sentenced to
death;'^^ when there are procedural obstacles;109 when there is considerable delay;"^
when the convict was abducted by police officers;!^' or any other number of
circumstances. The statute itself allows for state remedies not to be exhausted if the
State has expressly waived the requirement.il- jj^ ^j^y q^^q^ it is the petitioner who
must show that the requirement was complied with.i '^
^^ipicard V. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); see also Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon. 466
U.S. 294; but see Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346 (1989) (Where a new claim was first presented before
the State Supreme Court, there was not a fair opportunity granted)
' ^- Vasquez v. Hillery, supra note 96
lO^CoM/jA' Court V. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979); see generally Tabak, Ronald J. and Lane, J. Mark,
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND LEGISLATIVE "REFORM" OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND CURRENT PROPOSALS, 55 Alb. L. Rev. 1 (1991) at 7 (Where it is suggested
that in exhaustion, a more rigid approach, requiring total exhaustion is being slowly adopted by the
Court)
^^^Ex Parte Royale, 117 U.S. 241 (1886)
^^^See Yackle, Larry W. THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE IN federal HABEAS CORPUS: AN ARGUMENT FOR A
RETURN TO FIRST PRINCIPLES, 44 Ohio St. L.. 393 (1983) at 399 (In this article, it is also argued that this
is the best approach, in order to avoid rigid rules, that do not achieve the comity goal of the principle, but
only serve to make Habeas inaccessible, to state prisoners)
^^^DuckM'orth v. Serrano, supra note 96; see also Castille v. Peoples, supra note 101
^^' Pennsylvania ex rel. Woods v. Cavell, 157 F. Supp. 272 (1957)
^^^ United States ex rel. DeVita v. McCorkle, 216 F. 2d 743 (1954)
lO^Gz-qy V. Netherland 518 U.S. 152 (1996)
^^^Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); see also (.Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F. 3d 1200 (1996)
1
1 ^Frisbie v. Collins 342 U.S. 519 (1952)
1 1228 U.S.C.§ 2254(c)
1
^^^Hernandez v. Starbuck, 69 F. 3d 1089 (1995)
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c. Federal Question must be Raised in State Court
In Federal Habeas Corpus cases, the constitutional violation which is being
claimed must be presented before the State courts, prior to the application lor Habeas
relief The failure to do so amounts to procedural default.""* If the petitioner fails to
raise such a claim, he must then show "cause" and "prejudice". "^ The Court in
Waimvright v. Sykes, also left open the possibility for a "miscarriage of justice" to
become an additional exception to the procedural default rule."^ The precise
defmitions of "cause" and "prejudice" were to be determined in a case-by-case basis.' '^
However the reasons given for the adoption of the standard may be summarized as
follows:
First, it stated that a contemporaneous objection clarifies the record
when recollections of witnesses are fresh. Second, precluding federal review
lends to finality in criminal litigation. Third, stricter procedural bypass rules
avoid "sandbagging" on the part of defense lawyers "who may take their
chances on a verdict of not guilty in a state trail court with the intent to raise
their constitutional claims in a federal habeas corpus (sic) if their initial gamble
does not pay off" Fourth, the Court opined that federal habeas (sic) review
detracts from state trial as a " decisive and portentous event."' '^
The issue of "cause" was first contrued in Engle v. Isaac, ^^^ where the Court
stated that failure to object to jury instructions, because they were considered futile, did
not constitute cause. Since then, the "cause" and "prejudice" exception has turned
significantly towards the behavior of counsel. '^0 yhe errors at trial must be serious
enough that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not complied with, and this
' ^^Daniels v. Allen 344 U.S. 443 (1953)
^^^Wainhght v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)
"6/j. at 90-91
""^M at 87
'
' ^See Lay, Donald P., THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS: A COMPLEX PROCEDURE FOR A SIMPLE PROCESS, 77
Minn. L. Rev. 1015 (1993) at 1031-1032 (citations omitted)
"9456 U.S. 107(1982)
'^O^ee generally Friedman, Barry, A TALE OF TWO HABEAS, Minn. L. Rev. 247 (1988) at 294-294 (The
analysis of the Court cases dealing with this matter, center on the respecting State procedures, when the
emphasis should be placed on the whether the defendant was responsible for the default)
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behavior causes prejudice so serious, in itself, that the defendant is deprived of a fair
trail.121
In Murray v. Carrier^-- the Court refused to narrow the appHcation of counsel
error as an exception to procedural default, because this would interfere with the
strategies of each individual attorney. ^-^ Instead of judging the counsel's trial tactics,
the Court said: "[]we think that the existence of cause for a procedural default must
ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objective factor external to
the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." ^ 24 jj^
any case, the ineffectiveness of counsel should be presented to the State courts first, in
compliance with the exhaustion principle. '-^ Furthermore, the current statute bars
"ineffectiveness and incompetence" of counsel during Federal or State collateral attacks
on convictions as "cause". '-^ One reason for this is that there is no Sixth Amendment
right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings. ^^7
An objective and external factor was found in Amadeo v. Zant}^^ where it was
discovered that the District Attorney's Office had sent memorandums to the jury
commissioners asking to underrepresent blacks and women in the jury lists.
As mentioned above, Murray v. Carrier, created another exception to the
procedural default rule, by stating that a "miscarriage of justice" could be an exception
to the presentation requirement. This, however, has been narrowly construed to equal
^^'^ Strickland V. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
'22477 U.S. 478 (1986)
123/^. at 486-487
124/j. at488
125m at 488-489
12628 U.S.C. §2254(0
'2'5ee generally Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (Where no "cause" was found, when
counsel missed the deadline to fde an appeal from the state post-conviction decision); but see Friedman,
supra note 1 1 8 at 300 (Explaining that this criteria is redundant, simply because if the counsel was
ineffective enough for it not to comply with Sixth Amendment standards, then this constitutes an
independent constitutional rights violation)
128486 U.S. 214(1988)
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an actual showing of innocence, but the Supreme Court has found no "cause", so far in
which the exception appHes.'-^ An innocent basis analysis seems to have backing in
the academic field. '^^
On the other hand, the prejudice prong has been generally defined by the
Supreme Court, as a "[] substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury's verdict." 13 ^ However, it usually uses an "outcome-determinative test"; this is. it
studies whether, without the error, the outcome would have been different. '^2
Nevertheless, the "prejudice" analysis, like its "cause" counterpart, is in all reality a
study of possible Sixth Amendment violations. '^^
^-^See Sanyer v. Whitley; 505 U.S. 333 (1992); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) and Herrera v.
Co///ra, 502 U.S. 1085(1992)
^^^E.g. Jeffies, John C. Jr. and Stuntz, William J., INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE AND PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
IN FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 679 (1990) (Where it is proposed that factual innocence
should be the main fact to consider when granting Habeas relief, disregarding procedural barriers);
Sticker, Jordan. INNOCENCE AND federal habeas, 41 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 303 (1993) (Suggesting that if
Habeas is really an "extraordinary remedy" meant to be used against conviction that are fundamentally
unfair, then it's availability should be easier to obtain, specially in those cases where factual innocence
can be proven); Friedman, supra note 118 (Where it is proposed that Habeas Corpus relief should be
allowed only in those instances where an appeal to the Supreme Court would be available); Berger,
Vivian, HERRERA V. COLLINS: THE GATEWAY TO INNOCENCE FOR DEATH-SENTENCED PRISONERS LEADS
NOWHERE, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 943 (1994) (Where it is argued that, at least in the extreme case of a
death-sentenced prisoner, there should be the possibility for judicial review, when he can proof his
innocence)
^'^'^Brechtv. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993)
' ^~See Friedman, supra note 120 at 295
^^^See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 130 at 684
CHAPTER TWO
A. Section 1983
1 Nature of the Remedy
It has been said that "[n]o federal statute is more important in contemporary
American law than 42 U.S.C. § 1983." • The statute reads as follows:
Every person who. under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects
or causes to be subjected any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of rights, privileges and immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
-
The Court has established that this section is a congressional remedy created to
enforce the provisions of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitution.^ The
statute creates, in effect, a cause of action against the authorities of the states, regardless
of whether they are acting within the scope of their authority or misusing it.^
To understand the precise nature of this section, a historical overview is
necessary. This provision was originally adopted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1871, three years after the Reconstruction Amendments. Its passage was a result of the
fact that state authorities were not able or willing to stop violent acts of the Ku Klux
1 lA Schwartz, Martin A., SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 2 (3rd. 1997).
242 U.S.C. § 1983.
^Monroe V. Pape. 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961)
4m at 171-172. C/ Home Telephone & Telegraph Company v. City ofLos Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913)
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1-^
Klan.-'' This is important to note, because it emphasizes Congress' intent to aher federal-
state relations by creating a remedy with an independent and federal nature.
^
Furthermore, the Court has usually characterized the remedy provided as a type
of tort or at least it "should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a
man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions."^
In summary, section 1983 creates a federal remedy, with tort elements, derived
from the 14th Amendment, to be used against state officials, acting with or without
local authority. In the following subsections. I will attempt to clarify the proper scope
of the remedy.
2. Scope of the Remedy
The best way to try to encompass the meaning of section 1983 is to first
determine what it is not. This section has a procedural nature, in that, it creates a
remedy; by which one may assert a Civil Rights violation.^ Conversely, this means that
there is no substantive right created by the statute.^ Consequently, the plaintiff must
assert an independent procedural and substantive basis to sustain a claim under §
1983.10 j]^Q substantive basis may be provided by the Constitution ^^ or by a federal
statute. 12 Furthermore, the statute does not create a grant of jurisdiction, ^^ but it
permits for original federal jurisdiction. '^
Although § 1983 neither creates rights nor confers jurisdiction, it
ftilfills a vital function. The Fourteenth Amendment establishes binding
-'See Schwartz, supra note 1 at 9.
^Id. at 10.
"^A/owroe, 367 U.S. 167, 187
°See Schwartz, supra note 1 at 14.
^Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979)
^^See Schwartz, supra note 1 at 13.
1 Wowroe, 367 U.S. 167.
^'^Mainev. Thiboutot, 44SV.S. 1 (1980).
^^Hagans V. Lavine. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
^"^See Fallon, supra note 58 ch. 1 at 1 120 (4th ed. 1996).
standards of conduct for state and local government, but it does not authorize
remedies when its provisions are breached. Section 1983 fills this void.
Without § 1983, the courts would be confronted with determming whether to
allow claims for relief directly under the Constitution, an issue that arises when
constitutional claims for damages are asserted agamsi federal officials. Claims
against federal officials are not covered by § 1983 because they do not act under
color of state law, but under color of federal law. ' ^
The Court in Monroe considered that the purpose of the statute was threefold:
"First, it might, of course override certain kinds of state laws.[...] Second, it provided a
remedy where state law was inadequate. [...] The third aim was to provide a federal
remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theor\\ was not available in
practice." '6
Following this analysis, the Court established, based on the broad language of
the statute, that although the origin of this section can be traced to the Klan situation in
the South, it was applicable to any violation of the 14th Amendment, independently of
the particularities prevailing in each state. '^ In the concrete case before the Court, it
ruled that the fact that Illinois had laws forbidding illegal searches and seizures did not
forbid the application of this federal remedy.!^ From this analysis the Court concluded
that the remedy provided is supplementary to any remedy available in the states, so that
it is not necessary to exhaust the local remedies before seeking relief via § 1983. '^
Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized that the catalog of constitutional
claims raised under § 1983 is very extensive:
[D]iscrimination in public employment on the basis of race or the
exercise of First Amendment rights, discharge or demotion without procedural
due process, mistreatment of school-children, deliberate indifference to the
medical needs of prison inmates, the seizure of chattels without any advance
notice or sufficient opportunity to be heard- to identify only a few.^O
^^See Schwartz, supra note 1 at 14.
^^Monroe v. Pape, 367 U.S. 167, 173-174.
1'7/af. at 183.
IV
^^ Wilson V. Garcia, 471 U.S. 273 (1985)
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To this list one may also add "[...] unlawful searches and seizures (arrests),
claims of cruel and unusual punishment, and the denial of due process or equal
protection under the law."^' So at least in the mind of some, the scope of application
for this statute is immensely broad.22
3. Requirements for Relief
In Gomez v. Toledo-^ the Supreme Court recognized two elements that must be
proven to have a valid cause of action under § 1983: first, a violation of federal rights
and second, that the person who allegedly deprived the plaintiff of federal rights acted
"under color" of state law.24 7hese requirements are analyzed in this subsection.
The relevant part of the statute mentions that the person sued must have acted
"under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state [...]."-^
Normally the requirement is not difficult to prove; nevertheless, situations may arise in
which the distinction between a private person and a state official is not clear.-^ This
matter was discussed in Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks?"^ First, the Supreme Court
recognized that individuals acting as private persons are not eligible for suit under this
statute.-^ However, the case at hand dealt with delegation of powers, from the state to
private individuals. The Court noted that the defendants were not acting on an
-^See Baber, Brett D., FOR EVERY RIGHT THERE IS A REMEDY: CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION PURSUANT TO 42
U.S.C. § 1983. 9 Me. B. J. 226, 226 (1994).
"But see Doumar, Robert G., PRISONERS' CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS: A POMPOUS DELUSION, 1 1 Geo. Mason U.
L. Rev. 1 (1988) (Standing for the proposition that the Court has made civil rights' litigation, and
specially § 1983 litigation practically unavailable to state prisoners) and Cantwell Michael K.,
CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. 4 Temp. Pol. & Civ. RtS. L. Rev 311 (1995)
(Claiming that although the areas in which § 1983 is very broad, the scope of use in these areas has been
narrowed considerably by the Supreme Court).
2^446 U.S. 635(1980).
24/^. at 640.
2542 U.S.C. 1983.
-^See generally Baber, supra note 2 1 at 228.
2^436 US 149.
28m at 156 {cWxng Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) 162.
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"exclusive prerogative of the sovereign."-^ In other words, for a private party to be
sued under this section, the state must have delegated to him a function inherent to its
functions as sovereign, or as the Court, put it "state action". -^^
The Court has since stated that "state action" and "under color" are identical
concepts. 3 ^ To determine if a particular action is "attributable to the state" the analysis
must first determine the
deprivation [was] caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for
whom the State is responsible; [...] [s]econd, the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the State. ^-
Concretely, the Supreme Court has allowed municipal entities, and county
governments to be subject to § 1983 litigation.^^ Furthermore, individual states and
state officials in their official capacities are not subject to suit under this statute, since
the Court has not considered them "persons" by the meaning of the text.^"^ In addition,
11th Amendment immunity forbids suits against state officials in that capacity, because
it is deemed to be a suit against the state itself.^^ State officials may still be sued in
their individual capacities.^6
It is pertinent to expand on the idea of immunity.37 The vast majority of suits
under § 1983 are brought against officials in their individual capacities. ^^ Generally,
'^^Id. at 160.
30/c/. at 163.
^^Lugarv. Edmonson Oil Co.. Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982).
^'^Id. at 937; but see Winter, Steven L., THE MEANING OF "UNDER COLOR OF" LAW, 9 1 Mich. L. Rev. 323,
391-392 (1992) (Sustaining that the term is a metaphor embedded in common law tradition, and means
that it appears to be, in other words the act of government appears to be legal).
^^Monellv. Dept. ofSocial Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
^^Willv. Michigan Dept. ofState Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
35m at 71.
^^Haferv. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)
^"^See Lewis, Jr., Harold S. and Blumoff, Theodore Y., RESHAPING SECTION 1983'S ASYMMETRY, 140 U.
Pa. Rev. 755 (1992) (Providing an explanation on who immunities work within the 1983 structure, but
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legislators, judges and prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity, while executive
officials enjoy only qualified immunity. ^^ To speak concretely of damages in § 1983
context, an official named in his official capacity has immunity because if he were to
lose the state would be liable as well.'^O A suit against an individual in his official
capacity requires that the state's "policy or custom" be the reason why the violation
occurred.'^' In a personal capacity suit the individual may have available all sorts of
immunity defenses, in an official capacity suit, the only immunity is the 11th
Amendment sovereign immunity .'^^ Nevertheless, if the state entity received "notice
and an opportunity to respond", it may be asked to pay damages and attorney fees.'*^
The other requirement mentioned in Gomez v. Toledo^"^ to initiate a § 1983 suit
is the deprivation of federal rights. As mentioned before, the rights that when violated
give a cause of action under this statute are either constitutional^ or statutory ."^^
Similarly, there is no substantive right created by the statute."*^ Therefore, each
protection granted under the Bill of Rights has a different body of law; in other words,
the particular elements required to prove a particular violation will depend, in large part,
in the right that is considered violated."^^
In addition.
ultimately proposing that the entity should be responsible, when the official acted under the government's
orders. Furthermore, the state of mind should be the only fact to determine the agent's liability, by which
only by way of intentional harm or substantial knowledge will the agent be liable).
^^See Fallon, supra note 58, ch. 1 at 1 124.
39m at 1124-1125.
"^^Kentuckyv. Graham, A13 U.S. 159, 169 (1985).
41m at 166.
42m. at 166-167.
^^^Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472 (1984).
4^446 U.S. 635(1980).
45A/o«/-oe, 367 U.S. 167.
^^Mainev. Thiboutot, 44S U.S. 1 (1980).
"^"^Chapman, 441 U.S. 600, 617
485ee Baber, supra note 21 at 228-229.
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Section 1983 docs not have a separate mens rea requirement. This
requisite mental state is defmed by the constitutional protection at issue. While
mere negligence is insufficient to establish a due process violation, a violation of
an objective reasonableness standard may give rise to liability for an illegal
search or seizure. Even some identical types of government action may require
a different analysis depending on the circumstances of the alleged violation. For
example, all excessive force claims are not analyzed under one particular set of
constitutional principles. Different constitutional rights are implicated when the
force is used against a criminal suspect from instances when the force is used
against a prisoner. Accordingly, counsel must be prepared to prove the mental
state required under the constitutional right at issue.^^
B. Relationship Bet>veen $ 1983 And Habeas Corpus
1. Scope of Relief Available
To analyze the scope of relief available by both the Writ of Habeas Corpus and
the remedy granted by 42 U.S.C. 1983, a study of the differences and similarities is
proper. Both remedies may be invoked when a state official violates constitutional
rights. 50
The leading case in this analysis is Preiser v. Rodriguez.^^ In that instance, the
respondents were prisoners looking for restoration of their good-time credits, which
would amount to release from prison.^-^ The question confronted by the Court centered
around the exhaustion requirements. The Court noted that if habeas relief is sought, the
requirement must be complied with, which is not the case a suit is brought under §
1983.5^ The Court stated that even though the suit before them was under § 1983, the
essence of the relief would amount to release, which falls squarely within the scope of
Habeas Corpus. ^4 If § 1983 were to be used instead of Habeas Corpus this would
"frustrate" Congress' intent to preserve federal-state relations, by way of the exhaustion
4V at 229.
5028 U.S.C. § 2254; see also IB Schwartz, Martin A., SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 572 (3rd. 1997).
5I4II U.S. 475(1973).
52m at 476-477.
53m at 477.
54m. at 487.
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requirement. ^5 However, the Court noted § 1983 is the appropriate remedy when
damages are sought, which was not the case in Preiser .^^ Similarly. § 1983 may be
used to challenge to prison conditions, when by obtaining relief do not imply a release
or a shortening in the sentence. ^^
In summary, two differences were noted by the Court in Preiser^ first, while
habeas corpus has a e.xJiaustion requirement, § 1983 does not; and second, the essence
of Habeas Corpus is the release from custody, other forms of relief fall within the scope
§ 1983 (including damages). In a later case, the Court stated that for an individual to be
able to seek damages relief, he must first demonstrate that he has had the underlying
conviction overturned. ^^ The Court in effect concluded that in improper confinement
cases § 1983 challenges could not be brought at all, in the absence of release. ^^
However, there is no obstacle for an inmate to challenge the procedure by which good-
time credits were withheld, without attacking the substance of the procedure, and
55^ at 489-490; but see Gerstein V. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) (Where the Court determined that
Habeas Corpus was not the only remedy available to challenge a Florida procedure by which a person
arrested without a warrant and charged only with information was jailed without probable cause, if the
prisoner sought only declaratory relief)
56m at 494.
^'^Id at 498; accord, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (In this case, the Court relied on Preiser
to through out the contention to restore good-time credits, but maintained the damages attack, in light of
the fact that this challenge would not alter the conviction).
^^Heck V. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994); see Steinglass, Steven H., THE IMPACT OF HECK V.
HUMPHREY ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, 554 PLI/Lit. 765, 775 (1996) (Describing the Courts decision
to use one of the common law elements of malicious persecution, namely the requirement that there be a
termination in the criminal proceedings, but rejecting the applicability of the principle to § 1983
litigation); see generally Wells, Michael, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS, COMMON LAW TORTS, AND DUE
PROCESS OF LAW, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev 617 (For an analysis on how the rules of common law have
infiltrated constitutional tort litigation); but see Beermann, Jack M., COMMON LAW ELEMENTS OF the
SECTION 1983 ACTION, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev 695, 713 (1997) (Questioning the Court's approach, due to
the fact that there is no evidence that Congress intended that such common law elements be applicable to
§ 1983 litigation, since the Court had not established the standard to be indispensable in previous cases)
^^See Savoy, Eric, J., HECK V. HUMPHREY: WFL^T SHOULD STATE PRISONERS USE WHEN SEEKING
DAMAGES FROM STATE OFFICIALS...SECTION 1983 OR FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS, 22 New Eng. J. on Crim
&. Civ. Confinement 109, 120 (1996).
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obtaining damages if victorious. ^^ Similarly, if the respondent is no longer "in
custody", habeas is unavailable, so a § 1983 attack to the conviction would not be
barred.^'
There is another distinction worth noting, between habeas corpus and § 1983
relief. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, allows for the payment of
attorney's fees to the winner in § 1983 suits.6- Congress allowed this due to the fact
that must victims of Civil Rights violations do not have enough money to afford
counsel.6^ Fees are not recoverable in habeas litigation, and this is an important reason
why § 1983 is preferred to Habeas Corpus. ^"^
2. The Problem of Res Judicata
Given the decisions presented in Preiser and Heck a problem may rise in the
context of res Judicata. The questions that must be answered are: What is the effect of
a state habeas ruling on § 1983? What is the effect of a federal habeas ruling on §
1983? What is the effect of a federal habeas determination in light of an adverse state
habeas ruling?^^
Based on the Heck ruling, it appears that a prisoner must first seek state relief
before taking his case to federal court, via habeas or § 1983.^^ The opinion of Justice
^^Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1585 (1997); see also Id at 123-124 (If a prisoner is looking
exclusively for damages, but is not challenging the conviction, § 1983 is allowed); but see Bloom, Lois,
SANDIN V. CONNER AND ITS EFFECT ON LIBERTY INTEREST ANALYSIS AND CHALLENGES TO DISCIPLINARY
SANCTIONS: THE EFFECT OF EDWARDS V. BALISOK., 576 PLI/Lit 371 (Arguing that the consequence of
Edwards has been to extend the limitations set forth by Heck to situations in which the inmate is
subjected to "atypical and significant hardship" in relation to normal prison life)
^^See Steinglass, supra note 57 at 781-782.
6242U.S.C. 1988(b).
^^See Schwartz, supra note 1 at 575.
64m
^^See Schwartz, supra note 46 at 602-603.
^^Heck, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487; see also Schwartz, supra note 46 at 603; but see Beermann, supra note
57 at 727 (Standing for the proposition that Heck deviates from the principle stated in Monroe, that a §
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Brennan. in his Preiser dissent, is that if the state proceedings end before the federal
trial, res judicata will preclude the later.^^ This same position was adopted by Justice
White in the W'b/^ decision.^8 The principle established by these opinions, was been
adopted by lower courts.^^ However, some courts have stated that where a state habeas
ruling has been overturned by a federal habeas judgment, the preclusive effect of the
first is no longer present; and may even be used as an offensive collateral estoppel in a
§ 1983 action.70
The interplay between habeas corpus and § 1983 action is further affected by the
Heck decision. It is admitted that habeas is the correct vehicle to challenge
unconstitutional convictions; nevertheless, if the prisoner is defeated at the state level
and in federal habeas corpus, the rules of preclusion may not allow him to seek
damages.^' This preclusionary interplay has even been extended to the area of
procedural due process by Edwards v. BalisokP- In this case, the respondent had not
had an opportunity to litigate his due process contention and had not asked but for
damages, against the withdrawal of good-time credits; despite this, the Court
determined that a procedural due process challenge against disciplinary procedures
1983 action must be independent of state interference and Gomez that requires only that a federal right be
violated and the "under color" requirement met, in order to initiate § 1983 proceedings).
^"^Preiser, 41 1 U.S. 475, 511 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
^^Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 475, 511 (1974)
^^See Schwartz, supra note 46 at 603 604. (mentioning the decisions in Silverton v. Dept. of Treasury,
644 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1981), Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981), Coe v. Zieger, 657 F.
Supp. 182 (S.D. Ohio 1987), Rullo v. Rodriguez, 604 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
'^^Id. at 604-605. (mentioning the decisions in Hamlin v. Warren, 664 F2d 29 (4th Cir. 1981), Thomas v.
DietzSn F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1981).
'^See Beermann, supra note 58 at 722-723 (Standing for the proposition that Habeas Corpus is not an
exhaustion requirement, since the rules of preclusion apply when § 1983 is sought, it is not enough to
seek habeas relief first, but the prisoner must win that judgment to be in a position to bring a 1983 suit).
"72117 S.Ct. 1584(1997).
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requesting monetary and declaratory relief must be preceded by the invalidation of these
proceedings.^^
However, under the Heck rule, a federal judge dismissing a § 1983 claim
because it would affect the outcome of the conviction, should do so without prejudice;
so that when the prisoner actually gets the conviction overturned he may still bring a §
1983 claim to obtain damages.^"^
C. The Application Oi Heck V. Humphrey By The Lower Courts
In this section I will provide an overview of the way circuit courts have come to
interpret and apply the principles of the Heck decision. I intend to clarify the principles
which Heck stands for, by looking at how the decision is looked at by the lower courts.
The cases presented here will appear in increasing order of importance by
circuit. In other words, some circuits have very few cases that are relevant to the
subject at hand; these will be presented first. The circuit courts that have developed
considerable caselaw in the area will be presented last, to the extent that it can be
systematized will be presented last. The only exception to this method I have chosen is
the Sixth Circuit. This court only presents one case; however, it is of such importance
that I have placed it among the last (and therefore the most important) cases. I have also
chosen to place it before the decisions of the Seventh Circuit Court, due to the contrast
in opinions between the two.
District of Columbia Circuit
When given the opportunity to apply the Edwards and Heck decisions, this court
took a narrow interpretation of the law. In the Brown v. PlantP^ the Circuit Court first
"^^See Werner, Tiffany A., EDWARDS V. BALISOK- IS THE COURT WASHING ITS HANDS OF PRISONERS' DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS?, 28 Seton Hall L. Rev 650, 679 (1997).
I^Id. at 605.
'75131 F.3d 163(1997)
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rejected the District Court's contention that a prisoner's administrative segregation
challenge should be brought before a Habeas court before a § 1983 suit could be
initiated7^ The Court concluded that Heck intended Habeas Corpus to be the sole
method of challenging convictions.^^ Conversely, a situation like the one before the
court, in which a favorable decision would not alter the duration of the confinement, did
not require the plaintiff to seek Habeas relief, before initiating a § 1983 suit. This is
what distinguishes this case from Edwards and HeckP^
Third Circuit
This court was asked to decide the rule applicable when a § 1983 suit was filed
before the conclusion of the criminal proceedings. In Smith v. Holtz^'^ the plaintiff had
had his conviction reversed and a new trial ordered by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania. Before the new trial could start, the charges were dropped. The § 1 983
suit was filed in the interim. ^^ The court ruled that for the purposes of Heck the fact
that a prosecution is pending does not distinguish this case.^' As long as there is the
capability to reverse the conviction a § 1983 attack is premature.^2
However, a Heck bar was not found in the case where a police officer used
"substantial force" in an arrest.^^ The court distinguished between an unlawful arrest
and unlawful use of force during an arrest. In the first case, a challenge to the police
proceedings may culminate in the reversal of the conviction. This is barred under Heck.
However, unlawful use of force is a different contention, which is independent from the
"76^
at 166.
^V at 167-168.
I^Id. at 168.
"7987 F.3d 108(1996)
80m at 110.
81m at 113.
82m at 112-113.
^'^Nelson v. Jashurek, 109 F.3d 142 (1997)
conviction that may arise after trial. Since this suit would not contradict the result in the
trial, it is not barred from attack. ^"^
Second Circuit
In Channer v. Mitchell,^^ this court got its first opportunity to construe Heck. In
this case the plaintiff had two contentions. First, he alleged that certain police officers
coerced witnesses and committed perjury to convict him. Although Channer never
sought to reverse his conviction, but asked for damages, the case was barred. The
reasoning was based on the fact that Channer never offered proof that his conviction had
been "independently invalidated". ^^
Channer also had an Eighth Amendment contention, that did not involve a due
process violation, challenging the conditions of his confinement while being held for
trial. ^^ Since this attack was independent from the result of the trial, no proof of its
invalidity was required.^^
This case was cited in another situation where the claim's result would not
necessarily invalidate the plaintiffs conviction. ^^ In this case a prisoner was
photographed naked, in what he alleged was a violation of his religion and privacy.
This suit was not dismissed in accordance with the Channer decision.^^ In this same
case, an allegation that excessive force was used by officers, which resulted in a
confession was also considered not barred under Heck. The court reasoned that even
though the plaintiff confessed as a result of the excessive forced used the connection
^^Id. at 145-146.
8^43 F.3d 786 (1994)
86/^. at 787-788.
^''id. at 787.
^^Id at 788.
^^Jackson v. Suffolk County, 135 F.3d 254, 255. (1998)
90m at 256.
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between this and the conviction was too weak.^' Ahhough the conviction was being
challenged at the time because of the illegally obtained confessions, the circuit court
noted that the state court has many options it may consider in its judgment. "For
example, the state court might find that the confessions did not result from the use of
force. Or it might find that the confessions were coerced by the use of force, but that
the failure to suppress them was harmless error. "^2
Under a different set of facts, this same court ruled that if a retrial was ordered,
the criminal proceedings end with the second trial. This is the correct moment to seek §
1983 relief. The fact that the retrial was ordered based on a Writ of Habeas Corpus does
not constitute an "indication of innocence". The plaintiff should have waited for his
acquittal on retrial to initiate § 1983 proceedings.^^
Eighth Circuit
This court agreed with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in narrowing the
extent of Heck out of Fifth Amendment violations, especially as they relate to
confessions. 9"^ This court recognized that under the harmless error doctrine, the
treatment given to the confessions that are being challenged may not necessarily result
in the invalidation of the conviction.^^ Citing HecK the court recognized that there are
exceptions when a § 1983 should be allowed to proceed, such as in illegal searches.
Based on doctrines such as independent source, inevitable discovery and harmless error,
a suit under § 1983 may not result in the invalidation of a conviction, so it may
continue. The court then extended this principle to Fifth Amendment violations.^^
91m at 257.
92w
^^DiBlasio V. New York, 102 F.3d 654 (1996).
^^Simmons v. O'Brien, 77 F.3d 1093 (1996).
95m at 1095.
96m
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In Armento-Bey v. Harper^'' a divided court ruled that Heck did nol bar an
inmate's challenge to a disciplinary hearing, where the plaintiff sought damages and not
the restoration of good-time credits. The court contended that these attacks did not
challenge the validity of a conviction. Then, citing Heck, the court stated that "section
1983 claims Tor using the wrong procedures, [rather than] for reaching the wrong result
(i.e. denying good-time credits), are cognizable. "^^
In Kruger v. Ehckson,^^ this court decided a case in which a § 1983 action was
sought in state court, but failed. Subsequently, the inmate sought Habeas Corpus relief.
After reviewing the § 1983 suit, the court determined that the plaintiff was seeking to
relitigate his failed claim. 1^0 xhe state court was owed full faith and credit so the
petition for Habeas relief was dismissed. '^l
In another case, the court denied an inmate's claim for damages after he was
denied parole under a state sexual offender program. 1^2 yhe court looked at the
complaint and determined that Schafer was challenging the duration of his confinement;
therefore, the conviction had to be invalidated before a § 1983 suit could prevail. ^03
Ninth Circuit
In the recent decision in Woratzeck v. Arizona Board of Executive Clemency^^'^
the circuit court looked at a case in which a prisoner sentenced to death alleged defects
in his clemency hearing under a § 1983 challenge. The court studied the case under the
Edwards decision. The court noted that this decision stands for the proposition that a §
9768 F.3d 215 (1995)
^°ld. at 216. (citations omitted)
9977 F.3d 1071 (1996)
100/j. at 1073.
^^^Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 44 (1995).
^^^Id at 45.
104] 17 F.3d 400 (1997).
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1983 suit that implies the restoration of good-time credits may not be sought if the
conviction has not been overturned yet. regardless of the type of relief requested. '^^
The court did not have any difficulty in distinguishing both cases. In the situation at
hand, the successful § 1983 suit would not demonstrate the invalidity of the death
sentence, it would only provide a new clemency hearing. '^^
In a previous case, Butterfield v. BaiL^^'^ this court molded the reasoning that
resulted in the Woratzeck decision. An analysis of the Edwards decision was also
necessary in this case. This court determined that to apply the Edwards decision the
lower courts must determine if the nature of the proceedings is such that it would
necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction; if the answer is positive, then the §
1983 action would be barred. '^^ In the case reviewed, the court determined that since
the prisoner was challenging due process violations in his parole hearing, that if
overturned would result in the release of the inmate, the suit was barred. '^^
The court got another opportunity to use its Butterfield test in Neal v.
Shimoda}^^ In this instance, the court faced a situation in which sexual offenders were
required to complete treatment before being eligible for parole.^ ^^ The plaintiffs
alleged that this new rule violated the Due Process and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. ^ ^ ^ xhe court reasoned that the inmates' only benefit from a
favorable judgment (besides monetary recovery) would be to obtain an opportunity to
^^^Id. at 402-403.
106/^. at 403.
'0'7l20F.3d 1023(1996).
'O^M at 1024.
110l31 F.3d 818 (1997).
11
'Mat 823.
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be heard by the parole board. Therefore, the decision would not necessarily imply a
reduction in the time served, so the suit could continue. "^
Fifth Circuit
The first instance where this circuit court got the opportunity to apply Heck was
in Boyd v. Biggers} '"* Since Boyd's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and
withholding exculpatory evidence would render the conviction invalid, the case was
dismissed.^ 1^ To reach this conclusion the court took a three step approach to be
considered in the future. First, the court must determine whether a judgment in favor of
the claimant would necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction. If so. the plaintiff
must show that the conviction has been "reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned
by the grant of a writ of Habeas Corpus. "'^^ If this is all proven, the case will be
allowed to proceed, otherwise it should be dismissed.' '^ This test has been applied in
cases where the validity of parole proceedings is called into question' '^ and the fact or
duration of probation.''^ In Orellana v. Kyle^-^ the court referred to the "liberty
interest" of the claimant; in other words, if the inmate seeks to be liberated, the claim
fails.121
I'^si F.3d 279 (1994).
'
'^/J. at 283; see also Johnson v. McElveen, 101 F.3d 423 (1996). (Where the court decided that a claim
of ineffective assistance of council and state trail court deficiencies must be pursued initially in Habeas
Corpus proceedings)
1 ^^Id (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
1 ^°McGrew v. Texas Board of Pardons & Paroles, 47 F.3d 158 (1995); see also Littles v. Board of
Pardons and Paroles Division, 68 F.3d 122 (1995)
1 ^^Jackson v. Vannoy, 49 F.3d 175 (1995).
12065 F.3d 29 (1995). (In this case, the court determined that a § 1983 suit should be allowed to proceed
smce the prisoner challenged the parole procedures only to the extent that a new hearing should be held;
therefore, a favorable ruling would not give the prisoner automatic release, since there was no "liberty
interest.")
121/,/.
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A good example of how the court applies the Boyd-Orellana test is Hudson v.
Hughes}" Hudson was arrested for burglary; felon in possession of a firearm and
battery of an officer. The two last charges derived from the first arrest. He was not
prosecuted for burglary, however, he was convicted for the other charges.'-^ Hudson
then sought § 1983 relief on the burglary charged that was dropped, alleging false arrest.
The court determined that since the two charges for which he has convicted derived
from the burglary arrest, a favorable ruling would automatically invalidate his
convictions; therefore the § 1983 suit should be dismissed. '24 Particularly important
was the fact that, since the claimant alleged self-defense to the battery charge, this
would in effect be a justification defense, which would render the conviction invalid;
therefore the suit was also barred under Heck}-^
Similarly, in Hamilton v. Lyons,^^^ the court found that a Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment challenge, in which the defendant allegedly coerced a confession and
destroyed evidence would imply a reversal in the conviction. '^7 However, an Eighth
Amendment attack in the same case was not barred, because the allegation that the
claimant was subjected to prison conditions before being convicted would not affect the
conviction. '28 On the other hand, in Clarke v. Stalder^-^ an inmate was allowed to
continue with a First Amendment challenge to a prison rule which forbade prisoners
from threatening prison guards with legal action, since this would not put into question
the validity of his conviction. '^^
12298 F.3d 868 (1996).
'23/^. at 870.
•24/^. at 872.
'25/j. at873.
'2674 F.3d 99 (1996).
'27/^. at 103.
128m
129i21 F.3d 222 (1997).
130m at 227.
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This same test was latter extended to cases relating to malicious prosecution.'^'
Even though the court recognized that Heck was driven by concerns of the relationship
between § 1983 and Habeas Corpus, not applicable in the situation at hand, it did state
that the court "broadly, held that any § 1983 claim, which attacks the constitutionality of
a conviction (or imprisonment, as the case may be), does not accrue until that conviction
(or sentence) has been [invalidated]".'^- Thus, the Fifth Circuit has applied the
principles of Heck well beyond its original scope, between Habeas Corpus and § 1983
cases, into any situation where a conviction (or sentence) is constitutionally challenged.
Sixth Circuit
In Schilling v. White^^^ we find the main interpretation of the Heck doctrine by
this court. The court first analyses the caselaw before Heck was decided. It noted that
the Supreme Court realized that § 1983 and Federal Habeas Corpus may provide two
different forums for the same violations. '^^^ Before Heck, this Circuit allowed an
exception to Fourth Amendment violations since they could not be litigated under
Habeas. '^5 Under these circumstances a § 1983 suit was not dismissed, since there was
no danger that the plaintiff may have wanted to avoid the exhaustion requirements of
Habeas relief. ^^^ This court considered that Heck goes beyond preserving Habeas
Corpus as the sole remedy for unconstitutional convictions, since it applies to prisoners
"in custody" as well as to persons no longer held.'^^ Given this set of circumstances,
the court reasons, that "[t]he fact that a Fourth Amendment violation may not
'31 Wells V. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90 (1995).
132/^. at 94.
13358 F.3d 1081 (1995).
134/j. at 1083.
^^^See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
13658 F.3d, 1081, 1085.
'37/<:/. at 1086.
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necessarily cause an illegal conviction does not lessen the requirement that a plaintiff
show that a conviction was invalid as an element of constitutional injury." '^^
Seventh Circuit
A similar approach to the Boyd-Orellana test was first applied by this Circuit
Court in Perez v. SifelX^^ In this instance the plaintiff maintained that the police
officers named as defendants conspired to procure his conviction through a series of
legal actions, such as: committing perjury, falsifying and withholding evidence and
conducting an illegal arrest and an illegal search. ^^^^ The court considered that all the
allegations except those relating to an illegal arrest and an illegal search were barred,
since they would undermine the conviction, l'^'
In Simpson v. Rowan.^'^- this Circuit Court explained further that an illegal
search and an illegal arrest are independent of the conviction that might follow;
therefore a Fourth Amendment claim is not barred by Heck.^^^ However, the court did
recognize that only when the criminal case concludes and a conviction is handed down
will the relationship between the decision and the search and arrest be known. ^"^"^ The
court assumes that the prosecutor has other evidence to support a conviction, besides
that which would be excluded; but even if the prosecutor lacks such evidence the
relationship between the illegal search and arrest and the conviction is too weak to
13957 F.3d 503 (1995).
140/^. at 505.
14lM
14273 F.3d 134 (1995)
'43/(5^ at 136, cf Copiis v. City of Edgerton, 96 F.3d 1038 (In this case, the court was faced with a
challenge on a search after the subsequent conviction. Under these circumstances, the court was in a
position to determine if the illegal search affect the conviction, post facto. After evaluating that the
search did not affect the conviction the § 1983 suit for damages was allowed to continue.)
144m
41
justify a dismissal of a § 1983 attack.''^-'* The court has summarized its position on
Fourth Amendment claims as follows:
(i) a claim based on an unlawful search or arrest may be brought
immediately, because a violation of the fourth amendment does not necessarily
impugn the validity of a conviction -the evidence may be properly admitted
anyway, or it may be excluded and the defendant convicted on other evidence-
and (ii) a claim of damages based on "the 'injury' of being convicted " is
impermissible until the conviction has been overturned. Thus a claim asserting
a violation of the fourth amendment necessarily "accrues" at the time of the
unlawful search or seizure, as we have held several times. '"^^
This court, like others has recognized that to determine if a potential § 1983
challenge should be sought in a Habeas proceeding first, the analysis should center on
whether a favorable decision necessarily implies a reversal in the conviction. In the
words of the court, "... this limitation applies only if the preclusive effect of a § 1983
judgment is certain." '"^^ To make such a determination, the courts should look at the
injuries involved, not the type of relief sought. These injuries must then be confronted
with the relief that may be obtained under Habeas Corpus. If the claim is so essential to
Habeas that it implies an action of this sort, the § 1983 attack is barred. '"^^
This circuit court has applied the Heck rationale also within the context of
disciplinary proceedings. Where an inmate had been put in disciplinary segregation
(but did not seek restoration of his good-time credits) the § 1983 suit was barred
because the sentence would be put into doubt. '"^^ Additionally, the court has found
suits under § 1983 barred in the context of jury selection, ^^^ a previously served
^^^Bookerv. Ward, 94 F.3d 1052, 1054 (1996)
^'^^Gonzalez v. Entress, 133 F.3d 551, 553 (1998).
^^'^Clayton-EL v. Fisher, 96 F.3d 236, 242 (1996).
148m, cf. Dixon V. Chrans, 101 F.3d 1228 (1996).
^'^^Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718 (1997); see also Lusz v. Scott, 126 F.3d 1018 (1997) and Walker
V. Taylorville Correctional Center, 129 F. 3d 410 (1997).
^^^Ryan v. DuPage County Jail Comission, 105 F.3d 329 (1996) (The court found that if it was found
that there was an unfair jury selection, the conviction would have to be reversed.)
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conviction. ' 5 ' and delay in serving a warrant. '5- On the other hand, in a case where a
person challenged § 1983 a criminal prosecution where the charges were dismissed was
not barred from attack. ^^^
^^^Anderson v. County of Montgomery, 111 F.3d 494 (1997) (The court reluctantly applied Heck to
determine that the fact that the claimant had never been in a position to file for Habeas relief, because he
was never incarcerated, did not constitute an exception by which he could seek monetary relief under §
1983.)
^^-McCurdy v. SheriffofMadison County, 128 F.3d 1 144 (1997). (The claim that a delay in the serving
of an arrest warrant, which resulted in the difficulty to put on an effective defense during trail was
dismissed, because its result would put into doubt the conviction.)
^^"^Newlin v. Helman, 123 F.3d 429 (1997) (It should be noted that in this case the person was convicted
on other charges so his incarceration remain unaltered by the suit.)
CHAPTER THREE
A. Obstacles For Damages Relief Under The Writ Of Amparo.
1 Public Nature of the Remedy.
In the first section of chapter one I explained the objectives of the Writ of
Amparo. Under the current, constitutional,' legislative- and judicial^ rules, the Writ's
objective is to protect constitutional rights and the constitutional system."^ Some argue
that the final goal of the Writ is to uphold the constitutional order, which is a public
function, so if damages are sought through the Amparo procedure, the nature of the Writ
becomes private.^ Such a provision would equal the Writ of Amparo with an ordinary
civil tort action for damages, when its function is to uphold the Constitution.^ Simply
put, the Writ of Amparo is not a tort action, but a method used to uphold the rule of law
in Mexico.^
This argument is based on the premise that the Writ of Amparo has a public
function, which would be the protection of the Constitution.^ Nevertheless, if the Writ
'5ee CONST, arts. 103 and 107.
"See L.A. art. 1
.
•'SeeTesis jurisprudenciai 1 1, Apendice 1917-1985, Primera Parte, Pleno, P. 32.
^See text accompanying ch. 1, § 1, at 1-3.
^See generally del Castillo del Valle, Alberto, LEY DE AMPARO COMENTADA, 231-232 (2nd 1992)
(Criticizing the procedure established in the last paragraph of article 105 of the Amparo Statute, which
provides for a way to obtain damages when the constitutional right is unrecoverable).
^Id at 232.
'Id; c/ "Torres Adalid, Ignacio" 5 S.J.F. 200 (5a Epoca 1919) (The courts of Amparo should limit
themselves to solving the constitutional challenge before them, without taking over the functions of the
state courts).
°23 S.J.F. 74 (7a Epoca 1967) (The Court stated that the Writ of Amparo does not deal with private
matters, its litis deals with the constitutionality of a particular act. Concretely, the objective of the Writ is
43
44
of Amparo is seen as a public action, in the context in which the Supreme Court has
sometimes seen it.^ then any attempt to introduce private law proposals (like damages)
is seen as a "legal aberration", that distorts the purpose of the Writ, as a purely
constitutional (and therefore public) remedy. '^
However, these arguments ignore the private objectives of the Writ, which is the
protection of the individual.' ' Furthermore, its public function would not be possible if
it were not for the individual who has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
acts of government authorities.'- That is the reason behind the principles of personal
grievance'^ and initiative of the affected person.''*
2. Effects of the Amparo Decision
The ruling in an Amparo suit nullifies or invalidates the act of authority. '^ This
means that the decision of the Amparo court will be limited to a declaration of
constitutionality; as opposed to a decision which sentences one of the parties. '^ In a
favorable suit, the ruling of the court will repair the constitutional violation in such a
way that the legal situation of the plaintiff will remain as it was before the exercise of
to uphold the constitutional system and the rule of law at the federal, state and municipal levels), see also
"Larios, Rutilio", 38 S.J.F. 2467 (5a Epoca 1933) (Stating that the Writ of Amparo has an important
public function which is to make such that the Constitution is complied with. This is specially true in the
context of a criminal case where the "social interest" is at its highest, since the public in general is
concerned with the prosecution of crimes and the fight against impunity); see generally, Burgoa, supra
note 15 ch. 1 at 571-572 (The Writ of Amparo has a public function is so much as it is the guardian of the
Constitution).
9m
^^See generally del Castillo, supra note 5 at 230-23 1
.
1 ^See cases listed in note 10, ch. 1, § 1, at 2.
^^See Burgoa, supra note 15 ch. 1, at 147-149.
^^See accompanying text ch. 1, § A2a.
'^5ee accompanying text ch. 1, § A2c.
^^See Castro, supra note 1 8 ch. 1 , at 344; but see
^^Id.\ but see Fix-Zamudio, Hector, ENSAYOS SOBRE EL DERECHO DE amparo, 63 (1993) (This author
maintains that a defeated suit will only have the effect of declaring the act constitutional; however, a
favorable ruling will not only declare that the act was unconstitutional, but will also order the authorit>' to
act in a constitutional way. In this last case, the Amparo resembles injunction and mandamus,
respectively).
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the unconstitutional act.'^ However, if the unconstitutionaHty is in the form of an
omission by the government, then the ruHng will force the authority to act in accordance
with the judgment, in a constitutional matter. '^
When the act of government that is being challenged is a criminal conviction,
the amparo ruling has some peculiarities. 1*^ If the concrete act which is being
challenged is a procedural violation (procedural due process violation), then the effect
of the ruling will be to remand the proceedings to the point before the violation was
committed and start the trial from that point on.-O
On the other hand, a conviction may be challenged per se; in other words, the
procedure is not challenged but the reasoning supporting the decision of the court is.^l
In this case, the state court judge must make a new ruling.-2 The ruling of the Amparo
court nullifies the previous sentence so that the lower court may produce a new ruling in
accordance with the Amparo decision.-^ In the occasions when the Amparo court gives
directives in its ruling, the lower courts are bound by these, and must follow them in
their new decision.-*^
The idea that a ruling in an Amparo proceeding is only declaratory constitutes an
obstacle to damages relief, since courts are limited to declare the constitutionality of the
^^L.A., art. 80; see also Tesis jurisprudencial 493, 6 Apendice de 1985 326 (5a Epoca 1923);
"Marroquin, Maria de los Angeles" 14 S.J.F. 529 (5a Epoca 1924) and "Moreno Esponda, Emilio" 2
S.J.F. 121 (9a Epoca 1995) (The effect of the amparo rulings is to return to the situation before the
alleged violation was committed).
'°M; but see Castro, supra note 18 ch. 1, at 345. (Admitting that generally the rulings in Amparo
procedures are declaratory, but that in certain instances where the act is in fact an omission, the
government is directed to act in a certain way).
^"See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 16 at 70 (This author supports the idea that, insofar as the Amparo is
used as an instrument to challenge judicial acts it resembles the French cassation).
20Tesis 392 Apendice de 1985 264 (5a Epoca 1929) and "Hernandez, Eladio Rito", 2 S.J.F. 261 (9a
Epoca 1995); see also Noriega, Alfonso, 2 LECCIONES DE AMPARO 840 (1993).
9
1
-^See Noriega, supra note 1 8 at 840.
—M, at 841.
23"Carey, Francisco B.", 17 S.J.F. 1408 (5a Epoca) c/56 S.J.F. 140 (6a Epoca 1961) (The reach of the
new ruling is limited by the effects of the Amparo decision).
24"Banco del Pais, S.A." 16 S.J.F. 121 (6a Epoca 1958).
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act that is put before them.-^ This would mean that any other type of rehef would not
be appropriate, since it would be out of the scope of competence of the Amparo court.26
This would seem to exclude any type of damages relief
B. Current Alternatives To Damages For Unconstitutional Convictions
1. Article 105 of the Amparo Statute
Article 105 of the Amparo Statute establishes the procedures by which to
sanction the lack of compliance with the rulings of Amparo courts. -^^ The statute states
that if within twenty-four hours of having the ruling notified to him, the government
official does not comply with it (or at least initiate the compliance) the Amparo court
must let the superior know, so that he may force the official to act accordingly.28 If the
official still refuses to comply, then the original files should be sent to the Supreme
Court.29
The Supreme Court will study the case and will determine if the omission is
excusable. ^0 If the Court finds that there is a valid excuse, then it will give the official
enough time to comply. If the official still refuses to follow the decision, or the Court
finds that the omission was inexcusable, then the person responsible will be removed
^^See cases listed in supra note 1 7.
-""Hernandez, Ignacio" 3 S.J.F. 586 (5a Epoca 1918) (The Amparo ruling should limit itself to the
constitutional declaration of the concrete case that is being resolved); "Olmo, Maria de Jesus y Perez
Tagle de Pascual, Maria", 20 S.J.F. 95 (5a Epoca 1927). (The Amparo rulings should be limited to stating
if the act attacked is constitutional or not); c/"Saldana Magos, Angel Ignacio y coags.", 92 S.J.F. 995 (5a
Epoca 1948) (The Supreme Court disallowed the substitution of illegal evidence for legally obtained
evidence since the presentation of evidence is the function of the prosecutor and not of the federal
courts).
"'"Huerta Rivera, Manuel", 2 S.J.F. 160 (9a Epoca 1995) (The Supreme Court actually recognizes three
different ancillary procedures for different purposes, but all linked to the non-compliance of the Amparo
ruling)
28l.a., art. 105,^1 1.
29l.a., art. 105, 1| 2.
^"C/Noriega supra note 18 at 843 (The public interest involved in the execution of Amparo decisions is
of such importance that it could only be left to the Supreme Court to decide)
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from office.^ 1 This same procedure may be followed when the individual who was
affected is not satisfied with the way the government official has chosen to comply with
the ruling. ^2
Despite all of the above, the plaintiff may ask the Amparo court for damages
instead of the material compliance with the ruling. This may be done without
exhausting the procedures mentioned above, the only requirement is that the judge or
the plaintiff consider that compliance with the ruling is difficult and that the nature of
the act allows for damages.^^ For this purpose, the court will initiate an ancillary
procedure. The Amparo court will determine if damages are proper, and if so. in which
form and how much should be paid.^"^ The procedure mentioned above can also be
initiated when the challenged act was a judicial decision^^ or when the authority in
question delays in the compliance or resorts to evasive measures or illegal acts.^^ But
in any case, only when the noncompliance is absolute.^
^
The text of article 1 05 is not clear as to whether damages can be sought in any
case, or only when it is impossible to restore the plaintiff from the unconstitutional act
in accordance with article 80 of the Amparo Statute. ^8 However, the Supreme Court
has interpreted that only when the compHance is impossible, can the claimant seek
^^CONST., art. 107, fraction XVI.
32l.a., art. 105,13.
33Tesis P/J 85/97, 6 S.J.F. 5 (9a Epoca 1997); but see del Castillo, supra note 5 at 233.
34l.a.. art. 105,14.
35l.a., art. 106.
'if:
^"L.A., art. 107, 1 1; see generally, Castro supra note 18, ch. 1 at 536-541 (The author describes in detail
how an Amparo decision can be avoided and what procedures can be used to fight the authority).
3'7p.LXV/95 2 S.J.F. 116 (9a. Epoca 1995); see also "Hernandez. Samuel", and 193 S.J.F. 105 (7a Epoca
1963); "Financiadora del Sureste de Mexico, S.A." 24 S.J.F. 26 (7a Epoca 1969)
^°See generally, Burgoa, supra note 15 ch. 1 at 572. (Stating that if the article intended for monetary
restitution only if the act committed was irreparable, then the public interest would not be harmed. This
would be the case if the act remained, however damages would still be awarded).
48
damages relief, as a substitute. ^^ In any case, there is no indication that the official or
the state must first undo the unconstitutional act and pay damages additionally.
This raises the question of who is responsible for the payment, the State or the
individual official. The act that gave birth to the responsibility is the act that was
judged unconstitutional.'^O The act is deemed to be that of the State not the individual
who in effect committed the act in name of the State."^' Nevertheless, the Federal Civil
Code states the individual officers are responsible for damages caused by acts
committed during their service; however, the State is obliged to pay any damages
caused when the individual does not have enough funds to cover the debt.'^^ y^is means
that the primary responsibility falls with the individual, but the State could eventually
be charged with payment.'^^ jt must also be noted that "State" in a civil tort action may
refer to the nation (more correctly the federal government), the individual states of the
union, the municipalities'^'* or any other public entity recognized by the laws.'*^
However, in no case will the superior of the public official who committed the act be
held responsible.'*^ Nevertheless the Supreme Court has determined that this procedure
came into effect so that no Amparo decision would be left unresolved.'*^
39Tesis P. XCV/97, 5 S.J.F. 165 (9a Epoca 1997).
^^See Burgoa, supra note 15 ch. 1 at 573.
'*1m at 574.
'*-C.C.D.F., art 1928; cf del Castillo, supra note 5 at 232-233 (If the person who committed the act and
the person who refused to execute the ruling are different, the responsibility is equal among them).
^^See Burgoa, supra note 15 ch. 1 at 574.
'*'*C.C.D.F., art 25, fraction I.
'^^c.c.D.F., art 25, fraction II.
'*6Tesis XVII lo.2, 7 S.J.F. I09I (9a Epoca 1997)
'*'7Tesis P./J. 85/97, 6 S.J.F. 5 (9a Epoca 1997); but see "Diego, Domingo, Sues." 31 S.J.F. 2277 (5a
Epoca 1931) (Where the Court determined that in monetary payments, the impossibility to comply or the
lack of budget are valid excuses to delay the execution of the sentence).
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2. Tort Action for Illegal Acts.
With complete independence of the Amparo scheme, there is always the
possibility to sue the public official in a tort action for illegal acts."^^ Any act that is
contrary to the Constitution is an illegal act and therefore subject to civil action. "^^ The
same rule we saw before applies; if an official commits an unconstitutional act, then he
shares a subsidiary responsibility with the State. ^^ This means that the State can only
be held responsible if the individual can not cover the debt. This position is contrar\' to
modem tendencies that require the direct responsibility of the State. ^^
However, this procedure is independent from the ancillary cause of action
described in the previous section. This cause of action is bom once the mling in the
amparo suit is complied with in terms of article 80 of the Amparo Statute. 5- The only
link between them is the mling of the Amparo court, which will serve as the primary
document used to prove the tort.53
A tort action can not be initiated within the context of an Amparo suit, because
this is a constitutional action that can only conclude with the determination of
constitutionality. 5"^ However, this is not an obstacle for claimants to start a new suit,
after the constitutional litigation has concluded. ^^
^^c.c.D.F., arts. 1910-1934.
"^^''Quimzoo de Mexico, S.A.", 175 S.J.F. 141 (7a Epoca 1983); see also Burgoa, supra note 15 ch. 1, at
574.
50c.C.D.F., art. 1928.
-^^See Fix-Zamudio, supra note 16 at 70.
^-See del Castillo, supra note 5 at 234; cf "Sociedad Cooperativa de Autotransportes Reformas y
Libertad", 145 S.J.F. 32 (7a Epoca 1976) (Standing for the proposition that the procedures of article 105
can not be started until it is clear that the official has disobeyed the amparo court).
^^Id.; but see "Director General de la Secretaria de Gobemacion" 46 S.J.F. (Tribunales Colegiados) 37
(7a Epoca 1971)
^^See cases listed in note 17.
^^"Belmont, Domingo", 19 S.J.F. 162 (5a Epoca 1926); "Director General de la Secretaria de
Gobemacion" 46 S.J.F. (Tribunales Colegiados) 37 (7a Epoca 1971).
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The tort action for illegal act includes the following rules that apply to the case
studied here:
1. Any person is responsible for the damages caused when acting illegally,
unless the victim acted knowingly. ^^
2. The claimant can ask for damages caused by moral harm; which include,
harm to the private life, believes, honor, reputation, physical integrity or generally in the
way people look at the person, among others. ^^
3. The State and its public officials are responsible for moral harm.^^
4. In determining moral harm the judge will take into account the type of rights
violated, the degree of responsibility, the economic condition of the parties and other
relevant circumstances of the case.^^
5. When seeking damages for moral harm, the claimant must prove the illegality
of the act and the harm caused.^^
6. The statute of limitations for a tort action for illegal acts is two years. 6'
3. Damages Derived from a Criminal Action
Justice Juventino V. Castro believes that a civil tort action is not adequate for
these type of remedies. He distinguishes between judging the act and judging the
person. The first is taken care by the Writ of Amparo. But for the second, a criminal
procedure is necessary.^^ Under this line of thought, the two must be kept completely
independent, otherwise the Writ of Amparo would be stretched so far way from its
original purpose that it would tend to disappear. Furthermore, the State would be
^^c.c.D.F., art. 1910.
57m, art. 1916, t 1.
58m, art 1916,12.
5V,art 1916,113.
60m, art 1916,117.
61m, art 1934.
^^See Castro, supra note 18 ch. 1 at 585.
51
unable to control the flood of litigation, that would drain it of its financial sources.^^ To
avoid such consequences, the claimant should try to prove its damages claim under the
context of a criminal procedure, that is being followed against the individual who
committed the unconstitutional act.64
If a claimant decided to take this route, there are several obstacles that need to be
passed before damages can be obtained.^5 The fact finding process would not be very
difficult because the Amparo ruling would provide most of the evidence, but there are
several procedures that must be overcome. ^^ First, the claimant must inform the
corresponding agent of the Attorney General's Office {Ministerio Publico) that an
alleged crime has been committed.^^ The agent would then start the investigation of the
crime.6^ Then, when enough evidence has been gathered the actual criminal procedure
may start.69 Once the defendant has been found guilty, he still has a right to appeal.^^
After which, he may want to excercise his own Amparo action, challenging the decision
of the courts.^ ^
During this entire procedure the claimant is not a party to the procedures. ^2
Only the prosecutor can participate in the proceedings.^^ However, the claimant may
provide further evidence, via the prosecutor or directly to the judge,^"* and in any case
64m
65coNST., art. 16,112.
"""Belmont, Domingo", 19 S.J.F. 162 (5a Epoca 1926); "Director General de la Secretaria de
Gobemacion" 46 S.J.F. (Tribunales Colegiados) 37 (7a Epoca 1971).
67coNST., art. 16, f 2; accord. C.F.P.P., art. 1 13, ^ 1.
68 C.F.P.P., art. 113,t 1.
69coNST., art. 16, t 2; accorc/ C.F.P.P., art. 134.
"^^c.F.p.p., art. 365.
"^Il.a., art. 158.
"^^c.F.P.P., art. 141,^ 1.
^^CONST., art. 21.
"^^c.F.P.P., art. 141,113.
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will be called by the judge to explain what rights of his are at stake.^^ He will also have
the right to be assisted by a lawyer^^ and be present during any hearing7^ Finally, the
victim may appeal any decision of the judge, but only as they relate to the reparations.^^
C. The Possible Application Of Habeas Corpus And Section 1983 Principles
To The Writ Of Amparo.
In this chapter I have tried to describe the theoretical obstacles to damages relief
under the current Amparo scheme.^^ Then I tried to briefly explain, the legal methods
by which a person who has been unlawfully convicted can seek damages. Although,
there are clear ways by which a wrongfully convicted prisoner can seek damages, one is
an ordinary civil law tort^^ and the other is a criminal process,^' which gives limited
participation to the actual victim. ^-^ Despite this, there is no constitutional tort action
for the victims of unconstitutional convictions, or generally any other acts.^^
The difficulty of obtaining damages presented by the criminal procedure is
evidence enough that this method for the recovery of damages is not efficient enough to
be considered as a real remedy for unconstitutional convictions. Furthermore, this is a
procedure where the victim's participation is of secondary importance, since the
prosecutor is the main party. ^"^ This same statement can not be easily said about the tort
action for illegal acts.
"^^c.F.P.P., art. 141,^4.
"^^C.F.P.P., art. 141, t 1, fraction I.
^^C.F.P.P., art. 141, t 1, fraction II.
^^C.F.P.P., art. 365.
'^See text accompanying § Al and A2.
°^See text accompanying § B2.
°^See text accompanying § B3.
82m
°^See text accompanying § A2.
^^See C.F.P.P., art. 141, TJ 1.
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The reasons why this procedure is not sufficiently effective for damages relief
are the same reasons why a constitutional tort remedy is needed. Ihe main problem
presented by the civil tort action is that it lacks the availability necessary to become a
real remedy. The claimant must first seek a declaration of unconstitutionality from an
Amparo court, before this action can be initiated. ^^ As I will explain later, under the
current scheme, constitutional decisions can only be made by Amparo courts;^^ this
exclusive jurisdiction has been useful in avoiding problems of res judicata. ^^
What this means to the claimant is that he must win two different judgment
procedures before obtaining damages. What this means to the legal system is that
damages may be awarded by the civil court;^^ but only the Amparo courts can declare
its unconstitutionality. ^9 Thus an incongruent situation may arise. To avoid these
problems, it is best to keep the decision of damages and the declaration of
unconstitutionality within one procedure, preferably the Amparo procedure.
There is another advantage for litigating damages under the Writ of Amparo.
There is a principle applicable in the Writ of Amparo called suplencia de la queja. This
procedural principle states that in certain occasions, the Amparo tribunal must strip
itself of its impartiality and correct any mistakes presented in the briefs of the
claimant. ^*^ One of those occasions is when the Amparo deals with criminal law. In
this area, the principle must be used to the extent that omissions must also be
corrected. 9^ This advantage would also make it more accessible for claimants to seek
damages within the Amparo. Not only would their mistakes be corrected by the court
°^ See del Castillo, supra note 5 at 234.
^^L.A., art. 1, fraction 1.
^"^ Ct Presier,4\\ U.S. 475.
^^C.C.D.F., art. 1910 andL.O.P.i.F., art. 53.
^9 L.A., art. 80.
90M,art. 76bis.
"^ Id, art 76bis, fraction II.
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(something that would not happen in a civil tort action), but even if they did not ask for
damages, these could be awarded anyway by the court, as part of the omission that must
be corrected.
In the particular context of criminal convictions, there are certain similarities
between federal habeas corpus and § 1983 relief and the Writ of Amparo. which might
make it easier to borrow from these American constitutional remedies, in the hope of
incorporating a damages relief mechanism, within the context of the Writ of Amparo.
In essence § 1983 is a very complete remedy for constitutional violations, in that
it provides for equitable relief.^^ xhis means that the remedy may be used for
injunctive,^^ declaratory^"^ or damages relief^^ as it is appropriate in each case. This
diversity of relief mechanisms is also available with a Writ of Amparo, in so far as the
destruction of the unconstitutional act is nullified.^^ However, there is no indication
that damages are available within the context of the Amparo review, in addition to the
nullification of the act.^^
The requirements necessary to obtain relief under the Heck rule, which combines
habeas corpus and § 1983 are similar to the requirements necessary to obtain relief
under an Amparo suit, for state convictions. Habeas corpus and Amparo have
exhaustion requirements, which basically ask that the plaintiff challenge the conviction
at a state level first.^^ The personal and direct grievance of the Writ of Amparo can also
be analogized to the "In Custody" requirement of the Habeas Corpus list of
requirements.99 On the other hand, while § 1983 asks as a prerequisite for relief a
9242U.S.C. § 1983.
9^6. g. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 41 1 U.S. 475.
94e.g. Wolff V. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539.
95e.g. Monroe V. Pape. 365 U.S. 167.
""5ee accompanying text § A 1
.
^'See accompanying text § B 1
.
^°See accompanying text §§ A2 and B2, ch. 1
.
99m
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deprivation of federal rights; '^^ the Writ of Amparo talks about constitutional
rights; '^^ but the Constitution concedes the use of this Writ to protect the legality of
judicial decisions and procedure, so that in effect it guarantees the protection of federal
rights also. 10-
The only additional requirement that the Writ of Amparo asks of the petitioner,
is the initiative of the affected personJ 0^ j\^q Habeas- § 1983 combination allows the
plaintiff to sue on behalf of a group of people. •O'* On the other hand. § 1983 has a
requirement for the official to act "Under Color of Law" '05^ which is not present in the
Writ of Amparo. However, this rule is similar to the one that states that the Writ of
Amparo can only be used against official acts.^^^ Despite these procedural differences,
the Writ of Amparo '^^ and Habeas- § 1983^*^^ constitute judicial controls of
constitutionality. This facilitates any borrowing which might take place from the
American system to the Mexican.
As stated before, the arguments that would prevent the incorporation of damages
relief to the Writ of Amparo are ill-founded. They ignore the multiple private elements
of the Writ: including such as the principles of personal and direct grievance and the
^^^See accompanying text § A3, ch. 2.
lOlcONST., art. 103; see also "Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico", 70 S.J.F. 4718 (5a Epoca
1940)
^O^coNST., art. 107 at fractions III and V.
^^^See accompanying text § A2, ch. 1.
104e.g. Woljfv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539.
10542 U.S.C. 1983.
lO^CGNST., 103, fraction I; see also 8a Parte, Apendice de 1985, 32 (5a Epoca) (Private individuals may
not be sued under the Writ of Amparo for constitutional violations) and "Ceballos, Jose Alejandro" 9
S.J.F. 64 (5a Epoca) (When private individuals violate the Constitution they are responsaible under
statutory law).
^^'See L.A., arts. 158-191 (Describing the procedures to challenge state judcial decisions, including
convictions. These articles include chapters such as the complaint and judicial procedures, all of which
desccribe a judicial procedure); see also Buvgoa, supra note 15, ch. 1 at 176-177.
^^^See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 and Monroe v. Pape,, 365 U.S. 167. (For Federal Habeas Corpus
and § 1983 respectively).
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initiative of the affected person, discussed in chapter one. In addition to these, there is a
principle that affects the ruHngs in Amparo suits: the relativity of the sentence. This
means that the ruling in an Amparo suit may only affect the plaintiff, without having
any general effects on the population. '^^ Under these circumstances it is difficult to
support the arguments of the purely public nature of the Writ of Amparo. Thus,
damages relief is not an extraordinary idea that would deform the Writ of Amparo. as
some scholars believe it would. ^ ^^
If damages are to be available in Mexico for unconstitutional convictions it
would be wise to avoid some of the problems that the American federal courts have
created while trying to balance Habeas Corpus with § 1983 relief. In the caselaw
relating to this issue the Supreme Court has stated that Habeas Corpus is the sole
remedy, when seeking relief from custody.' ^^ It later stated that since Habeas Corpus
provided such a remedy, § 1983 is not the appropriate instrument to challenge such
constitutional violations, since they imply the invalidity of the conviction. ' '^ gyen if the
conviction itself is not being directly attacked, but may be put into question.' '^ This
principle has been taken as far as disallowing suits in which the duration of
imprisonment is at stake, but not the actual conviction.' '^
The rule of Heck does not entirely bar § 1983 suits in this cases, it simply states
that
'O^coNST., art. 107, fraction II; accord. L.A., art. 76; see also "Trejo, Luis", 15 S.J.F. 1294 (5a Epoca
1924), "Hernandez, Ignacio", supra note 26; "Saldana Magos, Angel Ignacio y coags.", supra note 26
and'leha, Abraham", 100 S.J.F. 406 (5a Epoca 1949); but see 6 Apendice de 1995 159 (5a Epoca 1943)
(An official who is not a party to a particular Amparo process is still bound by any ruling of the court, if
it is among its power to execute the unconstitutional act) and Castro, supra note 18, ch. 1 at 343
(Maintaining that this principle was set up to avoid conflicts between the branches of government, by
minimizing the effect of the Amparo decisions, thus limiting the power of the Federal Judiciary).
' ^^See generally del Castillo, supra note 5 at 230-23 1.
'
' ^Presier v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475.
1 ^^Heck V. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477.
^^^See Edwards v. Balisok, 1 17 S. CT. 1584, 1586-1588.
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[] in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness
would render a conviction invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. U 2254.' 15
In direct relation to Habeas Corpus, this means that the plaintiff must first try
this challenge, and be successful, before he can recover damages under § 1983.
Although this is not an exhaustion requirement, one must first seek "redress in a state
forum" before federal habeas can be sought."^ So in effect, one must first have its
conviction overturned in state court, and if that fails, then federal habeas corpus may be
tried.l'^ But only if the claimant is successful may he attempt a § 1983 suit for
damages.!'^
This mechanism poses several problems. The most immediate problem is that of
res judicata. If an action in the exhaustion phase or the actual federal habeas corpus
fails then there is no way for the plaintiff to obtain damages, since the revocation of the
conviction never took place.' '^ The next problem is that, even if these procedural
obstacles are successfully overcome, the claimant must then hurdle the barriers
presented by the statute of limitations and immunity doctrines. '-^
The statute of limitation that applies is the one of the state where the action took
place. '21 The courts have applied it in this sense.'-- The statute of limitations starts
running when the act is invalidated, since this is the moment in which the cause of
"5//ecyt V. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487.
"6/j. at481.
""728 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c).
^^^Heck V. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487.
' ^^See Beerman, supra noXQ 58, ch. 2 at 711-712.
^-^See Steinglass, supra note 58 at 786-788 (For an outline of the procedural issues not solved by Heck
and left to the lower courts for analysis).
'2'Mgra v, Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. ofEducation, 465 U.S. 75, 85 (1984).
1 99
'
— e.g. Rooding v. Peter, 92 F.3d 578, 580 (1996) (Expressly applying the Migra rule); Washington v.
Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 555 (1997) (Recognizing Illinois' 2 year statute of limitations)
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action under § 1983 is born.'23 Jhis would normally give the claimanl more time to
seek damages relief. '24 However, the Seventh and Third Circuit have faced challenges
to illegal arrests and judged that since the invalidity of the arrest would not necessarily
affect the conviction, the statute of limitations started running at the time of the
arrest. 1-5 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit applied the principle of issue preclusion to a §
1983 suit that had been previously litigated in a state criminal trial. '-^
The obstacle presented by immunity was outlined in the previous chapter.'-^ In
this part it would suffice to say that immunity has been a bar for damages relief under §
1983 suits against judicial officers, '28 prosecutors when presenting the state's case
and '29 parole board members in their quasi-judicial functions. '^^ On the other hand,
immunity was not recognized in a case where a sheriff delayed in serving a warrant,
because he exceeded the actual delegated power of the state. '^'
The question of immunity as an obstacle for damages relief under the Writ of
Amparo is variable, it will depend on how each individual state of the union treats its
own officials. '^2 However, if the Federal Constitution is to provide a guideline as to
how immunity should be treated, then it can be said that while for criminal
responsibility the House of Deputies must declare that there is enough evidence to
proceed against high ranking officials, '^^ there is no such buffer when dealing with
^-^See Steinglass, supra note 58 at 793.
124m
'25pe/-ez V. Si/el, 57 F.3d 503 and Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108.
^^^Simmons V. O'Brien, 77 F.3d 1093.
^-'See accompanying text § A3.
^^^Boydv. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279.
'29/^. and Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868
'30yV/cGreH' v. Texas Board of Pardons, 47 F.3d 158 and Littles v. Board of Pardons and Paroles
Division, 68 F.3d 122.
^^^McCurdyv. SheriffofMadison County, 128 F.3d 1 144.
'32coNST., art. 108, t 2 and CONST., art. 113.
'33coNST., art. lll,t 1.
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civil suits. '^'^ The title dealing with the responsibility does not mention any type of
immunity available, for public officials, except the President. '^^ Furthermore, it is
stated that public officials are responsible for their actions or omissions while
performing their duties. ^^^
The problem of res Judicata can also be avoided. Since the Writ of Amparo is
the only way in which constitutional rights violations can be repaired, '^^ there can not
be any other forum in which the constitutional rights of individuals is ascerted.'^^
Therefore, there can not be contradicting decisions upon the judgment of
constitutionality of one same act. This is why the Writ of Amparo is not available
against rulings in other Amparo decisions; ^^^ against acts that are being litigated in
another court, where the claimant and the officials are also the same, even though the
alleged violations are different^'^O or in the execution of Amparo rulings. ^'^^
D. Necessan' Changes For The Adoption Of Damages In Constitutional
Litigation.
Under these circumstances it would not be difficult to incorporate a damages
provision for unconstitutional convictions, within the Amparo structure. The only
constitutional requirement for Amparo decisions is that they do not make general
declarations to the constitutionality of the act or law, in a way that would make it
134coNST., art. 111,119.
^^^coNST., art. 108,12.
136coNST., art. 108, 1 1
l^^L.A., art 1, fraction I.
^^°See generally Burgoa, supra note 15 ch. 1 at 145-148 (The Writ of Amparo is the methos chosen in
the Constitution to uphold its provisions, contrasting with other countries where the methods used arfe
political or by a diverse number of actions or writs)
13\.A., art. 73, fraction II.
^40l.A., art. 73, fraction III.
^41l.a., art. 73, fraction IV.
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applicable to the population as a whole. ''^^ Therefore, any reform proposed in this
context would avoid the complicated procedure set up for constitutional reform. '"^^
The only changes would have to come in the Amparo Statute, concretely article
80. As we saw before, this article limits the scope of relief of the Amparo rulings to a
simple invalidation of the unconstitutional act or omission. '"^"^ The new precept would
have to include a new sentence or paragraph allowing the Amparo court to award
damages, when the claimant sought them. For procedural gaps, the Federal Civil
Procedure Code may be used.''^^ j]^q j^st paragraph of article 105 would have to be set
aside. Since damages would be available under the primary suit, any provision (or
precedent) related to damages as a substitute measure would become obsolete.
However, the provision of article 105 that states that the Amparo court would determine
the form and quantity of the damages given may be transferred to article 80. so that it
may apply within the main trial.
Since only the Federal Civil Procedure Code may be used to fill in gaps in the
law. 146 it might be useful to include a separate section that would provide the court with
guidelines to how damages may be awarded. Otherwise, a simple precept may be
included (maybe as a separate paragraph of article 80) in which the Amparo courts
would be allowed to use the guidelines provided for in the Civil Code in this area,
particularly, the title that refers to responsibility derived from illegal acts.l'^^
Finally, the interpretations of the Supreme Court and of the Circuit Courts would
become obsolete. In Mexico, the courts do not create law, but interpret it.'"^^ In other
I'^^coNST., art 107, fraction II.
I'^^CONST., art 135.
^^'^See accompanying text § A2.
I'^^L.A., art. 2, H 2; see also "Empresas Taurinas Mexicanas, S.A. de C.V.", 64 S.J.F. 2549 (5a Epoca
1940) (In the execution of Amparo rulings, the Federal Civil Procedure Code may be used to fill in gaps).
146l.a., art. 2, 1| 2.
^'^'^See C.C.D.F., book 4, ch. 5.
^^°See Burgoa, supra note 15, ch. 1 at 824.
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words, the courts need legislated law on which to base their decisions and
interpretations. '"^9 If their interpretations are not based on legislated law they become
useless. '^^ Therefore, the courts would have to build new interpretations to the
legislative changes, and restricted to those same changes. The considerable
interpretations that exist so far, would become obsolete, in light of the new law and
would not represent an obstacle for the implementation of damages relief under the
Amparo Statute.
'4V
CONCLUSION
In this work I have concentrated on a ver>' specific topic: the possibility of
borrowing fi-om the American legal system a method by which to obtain damages when
a conviction is unconstitutional, to incorporate into the Mexican legal system. The
starting point for this analysis was the Writ of Amparo. As warned before, this study
does not pretend to be comprehensive. I only tried to explain the requirements that are
needed to seek appropriate relief under this writ. Similarly, I tried to give the legal
prerequisites necessary to apply for Habeas Corpus relief, at the federal level.
These requirements were the direct and personal grievance, the initiative of the
affected person and the exhaustion of state remedies, for the Writ of Amparo. As for
the Habeas Corpus remedy, the prerequisites were: the "in custody" requirement, the
deprivation of a federal remedy and the exhaustion of state remedies.
Next I tried to explain the way in which a person may obtain damages from an
unconstitutional conviction under the American system of law. Since I focused on state
convictions, an analysis of § 1983 remedy was warranted. Again the focus was laid on
the requirements for relief. Only at this point was an analysis of the Mexican situation
called for. I studied at least two options for damages relief from unconstitutional
convictions. In this same chapter I considered the theoretical and legal obstacles for
damages within the Mexican legal system. The conclusion reached in this section was
that there was no constitutional tort action for damages under the Writ of Amparo.
Because of the ideas set forth in the introduction I considered it desirable to include the
possibility of damages within the Amparo scheme. As a conclusion to the third chapter
I stressed the similarities between the Writ of Amparo and the Habeas-§ 1983 relief
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mechanism and the possibility for borrowing this form of relief The changes needed to
incorporate this scheme proved to be minor.
This work has been ver>' narrow in its scope. As I mentioned previously, the
Writ of Amparo is very broad in its scope of application, due to the fact that any
government action can be challenged by it on constitutional grounds. By limiting this
analysis to convictions within the American legal system I only considered ver>' specific
issues. It is clear that if damages are considered within the Writ of Amparo. the work
done here can only be considered a starting point.
On one hand, a further study may consider these same questions, but comparing
with another legal system. Certainly, the federal system shared by Mexico and the
United States makes borrowing from the latter very convenient. But other countries that
share this structure of government may also be looked upon. Even countries with a
similar legal tradition to the Mexican Civil Law background may be suitable.
Furthermore, one may consider the possibility of damages within the broad Amparo
scheme, not being constricted to the area of convictions. These are suggestions that can
be carried out if one considers this work to be a premise.
I am only considering alternatives in the event that the American legal system is
not deemed appropriate for these purposes. The recent restrictive rulings in this area
may deter further analysis of this system, in favor of one which does not impose
numerous obstacles to the claimant in constitutional tort litigation. Nevertheless, it
should be noted that the simplicity by which this can be achieved should be viewed
strongly as an incentive to adopt these rules into the Amparo Statute. Indeed, it would
only be necessary to adopt reforms to this Statute in order to incorporate damages as an
additional form of relief for unconstitutional convictions. Judicial interpretations would
then follow leaving the old decision behind. But must importantly, a constitutional
change would not be necessary, because damages would fill in without any obstacles
within the guidelines presented in the Constitution. Perhaps the strongest challenge
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would come from those scholars who still believe in the predominantly public nature of
the Writ. Although I have given reasons why these arguments are ill-conceived, a
backlash can be expected from these teachers of the Writ of Amparo. If this offensive
can be overcomed. then damages can find success and acceptability within the Amparo
framework.
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